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ABSTRACT
The “reasonable expectation of privacy” test of Katz v. United States is a
common target of attack by originalist Justices and originalist scholars. They argue
that the Katz test for identifying a Fourth Amendment search should be rejected
because it lacks a foundation in the Constitution’s text or original public meaning.
This is not just an academic debate. The recent ascendancy of originalists to the
Supreme Court creates a serious risk that the reasonable expectation of privacy test
will be overturned and replaced by whatever an originalist approach might
produce.
This Article argues that originalist opposition to Katz is misplaced. Properly
understood, the Katz test is consistent with both originalism and textualism. The
reasonable expectation of privacy framework both accurately tracks the
constitutional text and reflects a sound interpretation of its original public
meaning. Instead of creating a constitutional free-for-all, the test merely preserves
the original role of the Fourth Amendment against the threat of technological
change. Ironically, the alternatives that originalist and textualist critics have
proposed are either Katz in disguise or are less rooted in text and original public
meaning than Katz itself. An originalist might want to restate Katz using the
constitutional text. But that is a matter of form, not substance.
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INTRODUCTION
In Katz v. United States,1 the Supreme Court famously introduced
the “reasonable expectation of privacy” test for what is a Fourth
Amendment search.2 A search occurs, the Katz test says, when
government action violates a subjective expectation of privacy “that
society is prepared to recognize as ‘reasonable.’”3 Over fifty years later,
the Katz expectation of privacy test has come under widespread
attack.4 No one likes Katz, it seems. Everyone wants to replace it with

1. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
2. See id. at 360–61 (Harlan, J., concurring). The test was later adopted by a majority of the
Court. See, e.g., Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 740 (1979) (citing cases).
3. Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
4. See, e.g., John F. Stinneford, The “Not a Search” Game, 38 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 17,
18–21 (2015) (describing the Supreme Court’s cases holding various surveillance practices to be
nonsearches as a “game” that the Justices play to wrongly label reasonable searches as
nonsearches); Silas J. Wasserstrom & Louis Michael Seidman, The Fourth Amendment as
Constitutional Theory, 77 GEO. L.J. 19, 28–29 (1988); Gerald G. Ashdown, The Fourth
Amendment and the “Legitimate Expectation of Privacy”, 34 VAND. L. REV. 1289, 1312–15 (1981).
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something else, even if no one agrees on what its replacement should
be.5
The most important attacks on Katz in recent years have come
from originalists and textualists.6 According to these critics, the
reasonable expectation of privacy test has no basis in the text or
original understanding of the Fourth Amendment.7 The test is just
judicial policymaking, made up by the Warren Court, that empowers
judges to do as they please regardless of what the Constitution actually
says.8 This objection has led to recent calls to reject and replace Katz
from originalist Supreme Court Justices,9 originalist lower-court
judges,10 and originalist scholars11 alike. No more made-up law, the
argument runs. It’s finally time for some serious constitutional
interpretation. And with the ascendancy of originalists on the Supreme
Court,12 it is possible that the Supreme Court may soon consider
whether to overturn and replace Katz with an expressly originalist test.

5. See infra Part III.
6. Although the meaning of the terms “originalist” and “textualist” are contested, for my
purposes I intend broad and pluralist definitions of the terms.
7. See infra Part III.
8. An early and still influential originalist critique was provided by Justice Scalia. See
Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 97 (1998) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) (describing
the “reasonable expectation of privacy” test as “self-indulgent” and claiming that “it has no
plausible foundation in the text of the Fourth Amendment”).
9. On the current Supreme Court, Justice Thomas and Justice Gorsuch have expressed this
view. See, e.g., Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2236 (2018) (Thomas, J., dissenting)
(“The Katz test has no basis in the text or history of the Fourth Amendment. And, it invites courts
to make judgments about policy, not law. Until we confront the problems with this test, Katz will
continue to distort Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.”); see id. at 2264–67 (Gorsuch, J.,
dissenting) (agreeing with Justice Thomas).
10. See, e.g., Morgan v. Fairfield County, 903 F.3d 553, 567–75 (6th Cir. 2018) (Thapar, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part); Thompson v. State, 824 S.E.2d 62, 65 n.9 (Ga. Ct. App.
2019) (Dillard, C.J.) (“[T]he Supreme Court of the United States has ‘not set forth a single metric
or exhaustive list of considerations to resolve the circumstances in which a person can be said to
have a reasonable expectation of privacy . . . .’” (quoting Byrd v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 1518,
1527 (2018))).
11. See, e.g., William Baude & James Y. Stern, The Positive Law Model of the Fourth
Amendment, 129 HARV. L. REV. 1821, 1823 (2016); Jeffrey Bellin, Fourth Amendment Textualism,
118 MICH. L. REV. 233, 254 (2019). These articles are discussed at length in Part III.
12. There are now three avowed originalists on the Supreme Court: Justice Clarence
Thomas, Justice Neil Gorsuch, and Justice Amy Coney Barrett. Several other Justices are
influenced by originalism to varying degrees. Cf. The Nomination of Elena Kagan To Be an
Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States: Hearing Before the Comm. on the
Judiciary, 111th Cong. 62 (2010) (statement of Elena Kagan) (“Either way we apply what they
say, what they meant to do. So in that sense, we are all originalists.”).
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This Article argues that textualist and originalist critiques of Katz
are misguided. Properly understood, Katz’s reasonable expectation of
privacy test is perfectly consistent with textualism and originalism.
Granted, at first blush the test doesn’t sound rooted in text or history.
But first appearances can be deceiving. The reasonable expectation of
privacy test is readily reconciled with a close textual reading of the
Fourth Amendment. Further, the test offers a persuasive
interpretation of the Fourth Amendment’s original public meaning.
Viewed as a whole, Katz provides a sound textualist and originalist
basis for interpreting what is a “search” of “persons, houses, papers,
and effects.”13
This argument has two important corollaries. First, Katz is not the
free-for-all that many judges and scholars assume. Many originalists
hear the phrase “reasonable expectation of privacy” and imagine it
calls for judges to just make things up. But it doesn’t. The best way to
understand Katz is as a means of identifying modern equivalents to the
physical-entry invasions that occurred in 1791.14 A modern-day
equivalent of a physical invasion into persons, houses, papers, or effects
violates a “reasonable expectation of privacy,” and is therefore a
Fourth Amendment search. Identifying what counts as equivalent
inevitably requires judgment. Judgment implies discretion. But Katz’s
primary role is simply to ensure technology-neutrality in the Fourth
Amendment’s coverage of what is a search. Instead of being an inkblot,
the Katz test ensures that the original Fourth Amendment does not
become outdated as a result of technological change.
The second corollary is that efforts to reject Katz and find a textual
or originalist alternative generally end up recreating it. Granted, the
alternatives use different language. There is nothing magic about the
term-of-art “reasonable expectation of privacy.” Courts could
profitably root search doctrine more explicitly in the text and history.
But this is primarily a question of form, not substance. No matter what
formal test is used, or how the doctrine is expressed, judges seeking a
textualist or originalist alternative to Katz will encounter the same task
of identifying modern equivalents to traditional physical entries into
private spaces that Katz prompts. They will tend to use the same
concepts, with the same limits, regardless of what label they use.

13.
14.

U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
See infra Part I.A.
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This Article proceeds in three parts. Part I explains how the Katz
reasonable expectation of privacy test is easily reconciled with the text
of the Fourth Amendment. Part II explains how Katz is consistent with
the Fourth Amendment’s original public meaning. Part III explores
and responds to prominent originalist and textualist alternatives
offered by both judges and scholars.
I. A TEXTUALIST UNDERSTANDING OF KATZ
My first claim is that the Katz reasonable expectation of privacy
test is consistent with the text of the Fourth Amendment. This Part
breaks down the constitutional text and shows how the Katz
framework matches it. From a textualist perspective, Katz asks all the
right textualist questions. Although Katz is sometimes dismissed as a
doctrine unrooted from text, that is only a matter of form. Understood
in context, the substance of Katz neatly tracks a textualist approach to
constitutional interpretation.
This Part has five sections. It starts by studying the constitutional
text and identifies the four questions the text raises. It turns next to the
Katz test and shows how it aligns nicely with the text. Third, it explains
the erroneous premises of the textualist objections to Katz. It then
shows the long historical pedigree of using privacy as a guide to the
Fourth Amendment search test. It concludes by explaining the
weakness in Justice Hugo Black’s textualist Katz dissent.
A. Breaking Down the Constitutional Text
We start, of course, with the text:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause,
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the
place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.15

The single sentence of the Fourth Amendment divides into two
parts. The second part, the warrant clause, is narrowly about search
warrants and need not concern us here. To understand when a search
triggers the Fourth Amendment, it’s the first part that matters: the right

15.

U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
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of the people “against unreasonable searches and seizures” of “their
persons, houses, papers, and effects.”16
From a textualist perspective, the search inquiry breaks into four
questions:
(1) Is the item to be protected a person, house, paper, or effect? The
Fourth Amendment only extends protections to “persons, houses,
papers, and effects.” We need to know if the government action
involves one of those four enumerated items.
(2) If so, was the protected item searched or seized? The Fourth
Amendment only limits “searches” or “seizures” of persons, houses,
papers, and effects. We need to know if the protected item was
subjected to a search or seizure.
(3) If so, was the item that was searched or seized “their” person, house,
paper, or effect? The constitutional text says the people have a Fourth
Amendment right in “their” persons, houses, papers, and effects. We
need to know when such a thing is theirs, as compared to someone
else’s.
(4) If so, was the search or seizure “unreasonable”? The Fourth
Amendment only prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures, so we
need to know when searches or seizures are reasonable and when they
are unreasonable.

At first blush, the Katz test might seem unrelated to the textual
questions above. The formal doctrine is often stated as a two-step test
announced in Justice John Marshall Harlan’s Katz concurrence: Did
the person “exhibit[] an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy”?17
Second, if so, was “the expectation . . . one that society is prepared to
recognize as ‘reasonable’”?18 That sure sounds unmoored from the
text. The language of the Fourth Amendment doesn’t mention
“privacy,” or any role of “expectations” about it. And who is “society,”
and why should its view of what is reasonable matter? We have
legislatures to consider societal views. And judges seeking to know
what “society” thinks presumably will just channel their own opinions.
At first blush, the Katz test sounds entirely nontextual.

16.
17.
18.

Id.
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
Id.
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This view is common.19 But it is also wrong, because it
misunderstands the Katz test. It misunderstands where the test comes
from and what it is doing. And most importantly, for our purposes, it
misunderstands how the question in Katz, and the answer that its test
provides, neatly fits within the text of the Fourth Amendment.
Properly understood, the Katz test aims to answer what is a Fourth
Amendment search of a person, house, paper, or effect.20
B. How Katz Fits the Text
We can appreciate how Katz fits the text of the Fourth
Amendment by starting with the case’s facts. The FBI taped a
microphone to the top of a public phone booth that Charles Katz used
to place illegal bets.21 When Katz went into the phone booth, closed the
door, and paid for the call, the FBI turned on the microphone and
recorded his side of the call.22 In a famously cryptic opinion by Justice
Potter Stewart, the Court ruled that listening in on Katz’s call was a
search that violated his Fourth Amendment rights.23 But it was Justice
Harlan’s concurrence, not the majority opinion, that had the primary
impact on Fourth Amendment doctrine through the introduction of
the “reasonable expectation of privacy” test.24 Harlan’s approach was
later adopted by the Court,25 so a close reading of Harlan’s concurrence
is useful.
Justice Harlan began by summarizing his view of the three
holdings found in the majority’s opinion:
I join the opinion of the Court, which I read to hold only (a) that an
enclosed telephone booth is an area where, like a home, Weeks v.
United States, 232 U.S. 383, and unlike a field, Hester v. United States,
265 U.S. 57, a person has a constitutionally protected reasonable
expectation of privacy; (b) that electronic as well as physical intrusion

19. Indeed, it is almost universal in the originalist and textualist criticisms of Katz. See supra
notes 8–11 and accompanying text.
20. My discussion puts aside what is a “seizure” and focuses only on what is a “search.”
21. See Katz, 389 U.S. at 348.
22. See id. at 348–49.
23. See id. at 353 (“The Government’s activities in electronically listening to and recording
the petitioner’s words violated the privacy upon which he justifiably relied while using the
telephone booth and thus constituted a ‘search and seizure’ within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment.”).
24. See id. at 360–61 (Harlan, J., concurring).
25. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
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into a place that is in this sense private may constitute a violation of
the Fourth Amendment; and (c) that the invasion of a constitutionally
protected area by federal authorities is, as the Court has long held,
presumptively unreasonable in the absence of a search warrant.26

Note that these holdings match up nicely with the four textual
questions. The first holding, that an enclosed telephone booth is an
area protected by the Fourth Amendment, is in textual terms saying
that an enclosed telephone booth was one of the places the Fourth
Amendment protected—a temporary virtual “house,” or, possibly, an
“effect.”27 The Fourth Amendment protected homes (that is,
“houses”), and yet it did not protect fields (that were neither “persons,
houses, papers, [or] effects”). The first holding of Katz answers
Question 1 of the text. It holds that a public phone booth falls among
the “houses, persons, papers, [or] effects” that the Fourth Amendment
protects.
The second holding, that electronic as well as physical intrusion
can violate the Fourth Amendment, was in textual terms saying that an
electronic intrusion can be a “search” of the Fourth Amendment
“house” of the phone booth. It was answering Question 2—whether
the house was searched or seized. Before Katz, it was uncertain
whether interception of electronic signals could effectuate a “search.”28
It isn’t entirely clear in which way the search in Katz was “electronic,”
as the facts simply involved a microphone taped atop a phone booth.
The microphone recorded sound, and the sound traveled through the
wire back to the FBI listening station. But the second holding of Katz
was that a search of a phone booth could occur without physical
intrusion.29
The third holding of Katz, that a warrant was required, was in
textual terms just as Justice Harlan recognized: it was Question 4,

26. Katz, 389 U.S. at 360–61 (Harlan, J., concurring).
27. I do not have a particular view of whether listening in on private calls made in the phone
booth is better understood as a search of a virtual house or of an effect. Cf. Bellin, supra note 11,
at 265 n.213 (considering whether a phone booth is a house or an effect). For the sake of simplicity,
however, for the rest of the Article, I will refer to it as a virtual house.
28. See Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511–12 (1961) (stating that physical entry
was a search, but the open question was whether surveillance without physical entry was a search).
29. See Katz, 389 U.S. at 360–61 (Harlan, J., concurring) (“[E]lectronic as well as physical
intrusion into a place that is in this sense private may constitute a violation of the Fourth
Amendment . . . .”).
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which asks whether a search or seizure is unreasonable without a
warrant. Katz held that the installation and use of the recording device
was a search that was only reasonable with a warrant or some other
exception to the warrant requirement.30
The only step explicitly missing in Justice Harlan’s summary of
Katz was the Question 3 inquiry into whether the search that occurred
was of Mr. Katz’s protected space or someone else’s protected space.
But that was made clear in what Justice Harlan called the “critical”31
point of the majority opinion: it was “a person in a telephone booth”
who “may rely upon the protection of the Fourth Amendment.”32 As
Justice Stewart wrote for the majority:
One who occupies it, shuts the door behind him, and pays the toll that
permits him to place a call is surely entitled to assume that the words
he utters into the mouthpiece will not be broadcast to the world.33

This answers Question 3. The phone booth became the constitutionally
protected space of the person who occupied the phone booth and paid
the toll during the period of the call.
The upshot of all of this is that we can easily understand Katz using
the constitutional text. In textual terms, Katz held that the phone booth
was acting as a “house” that the Constitution protects (Question 1);
that listening in from a microphone taped to the top of the phone booth
was a “search” of that house (Question 2); that when callers occupy the
booth and pay the toll, the phone booth becomes “their” house
(Question 3); and that the search of their house was “unreasonable”
without a warrant (Question 4). Every point nicely matches the text of
the Fourth Amendment.
C. The “Reasonable Expectation of Privacy” Test As Textualism
But wait, you may be thinking, there is nothing in the text of the
Fourth Amendment about reasonable expectations of privacy.34 True.
But the concept that the reasonable expectation of privacy test captures
is certainly there. Katz required the Court to deal with a problem of
changing technology: How should the Fourth Amendment apply to

30. See id. at 357 (majority opinion).
31. Id. at 360 (Harlan, J., concurring).
32. Id. at 352 (majority opinion).
33. Id.
34. As noted earlier, this is the near-universal textualist objection to Katz. See supra notes
8–11 and accompanying text.
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new surveillance technologies and new surveillance methods that
invaded privacy in new ways? The notion of a government act that
violates a reasonable expectation of privacy can be helpfully
understood as a way to ensure that the limit on “search[ing] . . .
persons, houses, papers, and effects” retains its vitality as technology
changes. Government conduct would amount to a search of a person,
house, paper, or effect when it invades a reasonable expectation of
privacy.35
It may at first seem nontextual to rely on a vague phrase like
“reasonable expectation of privacy” to identify what counts as
“searches” of “persons, houses, papers, [or] effects.” But I don’t think
it is, and some context is helpful to understand why. Courts before Katz
did not provide a particular test for what constituted a search.36 The
early cases on the meaning of “searches” used an uncertain mix of
privacy concepts and analogies to property without ever stating a
particular test for what made something a search.37 Indeed, the first
effort to articulate what counts as a search was Justice Harlan’s effort
in Katz. And that articulation did not express a new test. Harlan
introduced it in his Katz concurrence as a summary of pre-Katz
precedents, “the rule that has emerged from prior decisions.”38
Contrary to widespread belief, Harlan’s test was not designed to
make vague notions of privacy the core of the Fourth Amendment. It
is true that the test he expressed included the word “privacy.” But
Harlan had something specific in mind. The puzzle in Katz was which
kinds of spaces could receive Fourth Amendment protection from
searches. Precedents had established that homes, taxicabs, and rented

35. At least so long as the person, house, paper, or effect has been covered up from outside
observation, thus manifesting a subjective expectation of privacy. As I have explained elsewhere,
the subjective expectation of privacy test merely reflects the simple idea that a protected space
had to be covered to be protected. That is, if a protected space such as a home or a car was open
to the public, so anyone could see inside, the government did not conduct a search triggering the
Fourth Amendment by merely looking at it to see what was exposed. See Orin S. Kerr, Katz Has
Only One Step: The Irrelevance of Subjective Expectations, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. 113, 124–27 (2015).
36. See Orin S. Kerr, The Curious History of Fourth Amendment Searches, 2012 SUP. CT.
REV. 67, 68–69 [hereinafter Kerr, Curious History].
37. See id. at 69, 77–85.
38. See Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
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hotel rooms could, while open fields could not.39 The specific question
in Katz, as articulated by Harlan at the beginning of his concurrence,
was how to treat a phone call placed inside a public phone booth with
glass walls and a door.40 Was that more like a rented hotel room
(protectable) or an open field (not protectable)?41
From this perspective, the idea of expectations that “society is
prepared to recognize as reasonable” is not a free-floating or circular
standard but rather a more specific idea rooted in Fourth Amendment
history.42 Some places were treated like the home and others were not.
Some surveillance was a functional equivalent to physical entry, and
some was not. What’s the line? It wasn’t the common law of property,
a standard that the Court had never embraced and instead had rather

39. See id. at 352 (majority opinion) (observing the precedent on taxicabs); see id. at 359
(Douglas, J., concurring) (observing the precedent on hotel rooms); see id. at 361 (Harlan, J.,
concurring) (observing the precedent on homes and open fields).
40. See id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring); see also id. at 352 (majority opinion) (describing
the phone booth).
41. See id. at 360–61 (Harlan, J., concurring).
42. The common claim that Katz is circular reflects a basic misunderstanding of Fourth
Amendment doctrine. The apparent thinking is that a person would reasonably expect privacy
when the Supreme Court has said there is privacy, so the test for what the Fourth Amendment
covers is what the Supreme Court has said the Fourth Amendment covers. The most glaring flaw
in this argument is that Katz does not ask what privacy a reasonable person would expect. How
Katz applies cannot be answered by a poll about expectations. The Fourth Amendment protects
against invasions into protected spaces, not against surprises. See United States v. Jacobsen, 466
U.S. 109, 122 (1984) (“The concept of an interest in privacy that society is prepared to recognize
as reasonable is, by its very nature, critically different from the mere expectation, however well
justified, that certain facts will not come to the attention of the authorities.”).
It is true that Supreme Court decisions on what violates a reasonable expectation of privacy
provide a useful guide to what violates a reasonable expectation of privacy. But that’s because
the phrase is a legal term of art, not because the test is circular. As with any legal term of art, a
good starting point for understanding when it applies is when it has been applied before. For
example, to know what violates the Due Process Clause, you might begin with cases on what the
Supreme Court has said violates the Due Process Clause. That does not mean that due process is
circular. Rather, it merely reflects the fact that understanding a legal concept often begins with
reading cases that apply it.
I should add, on the claimed circularity of the Katz test, that Professors Matthew Kugler
and Lior Strahilevitz contend based on an empirical study that Supreme Court Fourth
Amendment decisions do not actually impact what most people expect to be private. See Matthew
B. Kugler & Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, The Myth of Fourth Amendment Circularity, 84 U. CHI. L.
REV. 1747 (2017). This seems right, as far as it goes, in that normal people are likely to be blissfully
unaware of Supreme Court doctrine. But I disagree with Kugler and Strahilevitz’s assumption
that Katz calls for an empirical inquiry into what privacy people expect.
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harshly dismissed.43 Rather, it was an idea that some places were
broadly understood by people as home-like, and some monitoring was
the functional equivalent of a physical entry. That explained Katz.
When a person entered the booth, shut the door, and paid for their call,
the booth became understood as their booth for the duration of the
call.44 Taping a microphone to the top of the booth and listening in
revealed information much like physical intrusion would have. It was
therefore covered by the Fourth Amendment.
Justice Harlan’s formulation can be readily articulated using the
Fourth Amendment text. The reasonable expectation of privacy test
asks if the government’s action amounts to a search of the individual’s
person, houses, papers, or effects. Identifying what “society is prepared
to recognize” asks what counts as a modern-day technological
equivalent of a search-by-entry into a person’s property. In Katz, the
public phone booth was the caller’s “home” during the call because it
became, in Harlan’s words, “a temporarily private place.”45 The caller
did not obtain title to the phone booth in fee simple. He did not sign a
rental agreement. But the booth was a space that temporarily became
his.
It’s true that the reasonable expectation of privacy test calls for an
inquiry into current social practices and values. But that simply reflects
the fact that, as technology and social practices change, the societal
meaning of a place or monitoring practice can change. Determining the
modern technological equivalent of a physical entry into a protected
space requires a judgment about equivalence based on current
realities. In 1960s America, a phone booth was a private place. Phone
calls from inside a public phone booth were the equivalent of private
conversations inside a home.46 As a result, Katz stressed, to exclude
bugging a phone booth from the constitutional protection against

43. See, e.g., Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511 (1961) (citing cases to support
that “[i]nherent Fourth Amendment rights are not inevitably measurable in terms of ancient
niceties of tort or real property law”).
44. See Katz, 389 U.S. at 352 (“One who occupies [a phone booth], shuts the door behind
him, and pays the toll that permits him to place a call is surely entitled to assume that the words
he utters into the mouthpiece will not be broadcast to the world.”).
45. Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
46. SAMUEL DASH, RICHARD F. SCHWARTZ & ROBERT E. KNOWLTON, THE
EAVESDROPPERS 3 (1959) (discussing public fears of wiretapping telephones, including in phone
booths).

KERR IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

2022]

KATZ AS ORIGINALISM

1/19/2022 4:43 PM

1059

unreasonable searches of a person’s house or effect would “ignore the
vital role that the public telephone has come to play in private
communication.”47
D. “Privacy” Back to the Beginning
But still there is that word: privacy. For some textualists and
originalists, invoking a Warren Court precedent that inserted privacy
into constitutional rights jurisprudence may be like waving a red flag
in front of a bull. It can bring to mind Roe v. Wade,48 where the Court
announced a new right to abortion in the name of “a right of personal
privacy” that the Court said had “roots” elsewhere in the
Constitution.49 Indeed, Katz was one of the cases Roe cited as
demonstrating “a right of personal privacy, or a guarantee of certain
areas or zones of privacy” from prior caselaw.50 Roe is anathema to
most self-identified originalists and textualists.51 With a lineage like
that, perhaps Katz should also be suspect?
Not so. The idea of relying on privacy to describe the scope of
Fourth Amendment protection was no Warren Court innovation.
Justice Harlan’s use of that word had a venerable historical pedigree in
Fourth Amendment law. From the beginning, courts had referred to
and interpreted the ban on unreasonable searches and seizures using
privacy principles.
A useful starting point is Jones v. Gibson,52 a New Hampshire case
from 1818. The plaintiff sued a customs inspector for searching his
stagecoach and seizing his goods without a warrant.53 According to the
plaintiff, the search violated the terms of a 1799 federal statute, echoing
the Fourth Amendment, that prohibited warrantless searches of a
“ship, vessel, dwelling house, store, building or other place.”54 In
construing the statute, the court considered what kind of searches
would violate privacy:

47. Katz, 389 U.S. at 352.
48. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
49. Id. at 152.
50. Id.
51. See generally Mary Ziegler, Originalism Talk: A Legal History, 2014 BYU L. REV. 869
(discussing conservative originalism and the backlash to Roe).
52. Jones v. Gibson, 1 N.H. 266 (1818).
53. Id. at 266.
54. Id. at 272.
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This prohibition of entering certain places, for the purpose of
searching for and seizing goods without a magistrate’s warrant, was
clearly intended to guard individuals against improper intrusion into
their buildings, where they had the exclusive right of possession and
privacy . . . and the words, “other place” mean other place, where the
occupant has this exclusive right of possession and privacy.55

No warrant was needed to search a stage coach, as “[a] stage coach is
not such a place.”56
Other courts in the nineteenth century shared the association
between privacy and search and seizure protections. Consider the
Missouri Supreme Court’s 1880 ruling in Ex parte Brown,57 which held
that the state constitution’s search and seizure provision—essentially
identical to the federal Fourth Amendment—forbade a broad
subpoena to compel Western Union to divulge telegram messages.58
The subpoena violated the constitutional prohibition on searches and
seizures, the court held, “by subjecting to exposure the private affairs
of persons . . . to the prying curiosity of idle gossips, or the malice of
malignant mischief-makers.”59 The court also lauded the dissent
below,60 in which the presiding judge had interpreted the constitutional
rule as protecting a “right of privacy with respect to one’s personal
affairs”61 that required good cause before “the privacy of [a person’s]
accounts” could be “ruthlessly sacrificed.”62
The U.S. Supreme Court followed suit in 1886, issuing what is
arguably its first major decision interpreting the Fourth Amendment,
Boyd v. United States.63 Boyd held that the Fourth Amendment
prohibited an order to compel a person to hand over their own
papers—in that case, an invoice for items Boyd had recently

55. Id. (emphasis added).
56. Id.
57. Ex parte Brown, 72 Mo. 83 (1880).
58. Id. at 94–95.
59. Id. at 95.
60. Id. at 97 (“In the dissenting opinion of Judge Lewis, of the court of appeals, in Ex parte
Brown, the question on which he differed from his associates . . . is discussed with great ability
and clearness.”).
61. Ex parte Brown, 7 Mo. App. 484, 495 (1879) (Lewis, J., dissenting), aff’d, 72 Mo. 83
(1880).
62. Id. at 496.
63. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
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imported.64 The Fourth Amendment must “be liberally construed,” the
Court reasoned, as “[a] close and literal construction deprives [it] of
half [its] efficacy, and leads to gradual depreciation of the right.”65
According to the Supreme Court in Boyd, the Fourth Amendment
“appl[ies] to all invasions on the part of the government and its
employés [sic] of the sanctity of a man’s home and the privacies of
life.”66 As far back as Boyd in 1886, the Court saw the Fourth
Amendment’s scope as about privacy.
The privacy focus continued into the twentieth century in the
years before the Warren Court. In 1918, the Court rejected a search
claim involving government access to exhibits left behind in prior
litigation, in part on privacy grounds: the government’s acts were
distinguishable from entry into a home, the Court reasoned, because
only the latter involved “an invasion of the defendant’s privacy, a
taking from his immediate and personal possession.”67 In 1932, the
Court declared that the Fourth Amendment must be “construed
liberally to safeguard the right of privacy.”68 The Court similarly
described the Fourth Amendment as protecting a “right of privacy” in
1946,69 1947,70 1948,71 and 1950.72
This history teaches a helpful lesson. Justice Harlan’s use of the
term “privacy” to describe Fourth Amendment protections in Katz was
nothing new. It did not begin with the Warren Court in the 1960s. It
had nothing to do with Roe or abortion rights. The Supreme Court had
been using “privacy” to describe Fourth Amendment coverage since
its first major Fourth Amendment ruling in 1886. Other courts had
64. Id. at 622.
65. Id. at 635.
66. Id. at 630.
67. Perlman v. United States, 247 U.S. 7, 14 (1918).
68. United States v. Lefkowitz, 285 U.S. 452, 464 (1932).
69. Davis v. United States, 328 U.S. 582, 593 (1946) (“The right of privacy, of course,
remains.”).
70. Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145, 150 (1947) (“This Court has consistently asserted
that the rights of privacy and personal security protected by the Fourth Amendment ‘ . . . are to
be regarded as of the very essence of constitutional liberty.’” (alteration in original) (quoting
Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298, 304 (1921))).
71. Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948) (“When the right of privacy must
reasonably yield to the right of search is, as a rule, to be decided by a judicial officer, not by a
policeman or government enforcement agent.”).
72. United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 66 (1950) (“It is a sufficient precaution that
law officers must justify their conduct before courts which have always been, and must be, jealous
of the individual’s right of privacy within the broad sweep of the Fourth Amendment.”).
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used the same word in similar ways decades before that. We can of
course want further explanation of why “privacy” is an illuminating or
appropriate word for an originalist to adopt—an explanation offered
in Part II below. But for now, we should simply recognize that there
was nothing novel about employing the word “privacy” in Katz. It has
been used to describe the scope of Fourth Amendment protection for
about as long as courts have been interpreting the Fourth Amendment.
E. The Weak Textualism of Justice Black’s Dissent
One last textualist objection remains—Justice Hugo Black’s Katz
dissent.73 In Black’s view, the majority’s holding could not be justified
by the Fourth Amendment’s text and was therefore wrong.74 But it is
Black who was wrong. His textualist method was fine, but his
application of that method was strangely narrow. Black ignored the
most obvious textual grounding for Katz. He dissented by rejecting
only a narrow argument in its favor.
Recall that the question in Katz was whether government agents
committed a Fourth Amendment “search” when they taped a
microphone to the top of a public phone booth to listen to Katz’s voice
inside during calls. According to Black, this was not a Fourth
Amendment search because the Fourth Amendment gave rights in
tangible things, and the conversation was intangible:
The first clause protects “persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures . . . .” These words connote the
idea of tangible things with size, form, and weight, things capable of
being searched, seized, or both. The second clause of the Amendment
still further establishes its Framers’ purpose to limit its protection to
tangible things by providing that no warrants shall issue but those
“particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or
73. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 364 (1967) (Black, J., dissenting).
74. Justice Black memorably wrote:
Since I see no way in which the words of the Fourth Amendment can be construed to
apply to eavesdropping, that closes the matter for me. In interpreting the Bill of Rights,
I willingly go as far as a liberal construction of the language takes me, but I simply
cannot in good conscience give a meaning to words which they have never before been
thought to have and which they certainly do not have in common ordinary usage. I will
not distort the words of the Amendment in order to “keep the Constitution up to date”
or “to bring it into harmony with the times.” It was never meant that this Court have
such power, which in effect would make us a continuously functioning constitutional
convention.
Id. at 373.
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things to be seized.” A conversation overheard by eavesdropping,
whether by plain snooping or wiretapping, is not tangible and, under
the normally accepted meanings of the words, can neither be searched
nor seized.75

Black’s error was his assumption that the only person, house,
paper, or effect that could be searched or seized was the conversation
itself.76 He ignored the more obvious textual basis for the majority’s
decision. Even if the Fourth Amendment text is read to require that
the item searched be tangible—an uncertain claim, but accept it for the
sake of argument—that was easily satisfied in Katz. The item searched
was the very tangible phone booth, not the intangible conversation.
The government’s use of a microphone to acquire the noises inside the
phone booth was a “search” of the tangible enclosure. The
conversations overheard were the fruits of the search, not the place
searched. Even on its own terms, Justice Black’s objection is
surprisingly weak.
II. AN ORIGINALIST UNDERSTANDING OF KATZ
The first part of this Article focused on the constitutional text. We
now turn from textualism to originalism. Even if Katz can be reconciled
with the constitutional text, can it be reconciled with the original
understanding of the Fourth Amendment? Contemporary academic
originalism comes in many flavors.77 The most widely adopted
originalist method today is “original public meaning” originalism,78
which asks, what would an informed observer at the time of the text’s
enactment believe the text meant?79 This Part addresses whether Katz
is consistent with original public meaning originalism.

75. Id. at 365.
76. Id.
77. Although public meaning originalism is the dominant form of originalist constitutional
theory, the originalist family also includes original intentions originalism, original methods
originalism, and original law originalism. See Lawrence B. Solum, Originalism Versus Living
Constitutionalism: The Conceptual Structure of the Great Debate, 113 NW. U. L. REV. 1243, 1251,
1253–54 (2019).
78. See id. at 1251.
79. See, e.g., Lawrence B. Solum, What Is Originalism? The Evolution of Contemporary
Originalist Theory, in THE CHALLENGE OF ORIGINALISM: THEORIES OF CONSTITUTIONAL
INTERPRETATION 12, 22–24, 33 (Grant Huscroft & Bradley W. Miller eds., 2011) (framing the
originalist inquiry).
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The answer is yes. At the time of the Fourth Amendment’s
enactment, the text would have been understood as embodying the
famous cases and arguments that inspired its enactment, especially
Entick v. Carrington,80 Wilkes v. Wood,81 and the Writs of Assistance
case.82 All of those disputes involved physical entry into the home.
They did not address the meaning of “searches” of “persons, houses,
papers, and effects.” Instead, they focused on the legality of warrants
that could permit physical entries. That focus was reflected in the
search and seizure restrictions in state constitutions and the federal
Fourth Amendment. Nor did the common law of search and seizure at
the time of the Fourth Amendment’s adoption address what was a
search. Although the word “search” had several contemporary
meanings, the primacy of disputes such as Entick and Wilkes would
have made those cases the focus of contemporary public
understanding.
Sourcing the meaning of the Fourth Amendment in representative
cases gives originalists a few options. One option might be to limit the
search doctrine to the facts that the cases involved, namely physical
entry. But another option would be to root the search doctrine in a
more timeless principle. Because technology can readily alter the scope
of constitutional protection, one option would be to interpret the
Fourth Amendment search doctrine to ensure its protection as
technology advances. This would require interpreting the search
doctrine to encompass both physical intrusion and its technologically
created equivalents. The result would, as Justice Scalia put it in Kyllo
v. United States,83 “assure[] preservation of that degree of privacy
against government that existed when the Fourth Amendment was
adopted.”84
And this is what Katz does. The best reading of Katz is that it
provides an equivalence test. Katz covers physical intrusion, but it does
more: it identifies conduct as a “search” of “persons, houses, papers,
80. See Entick v. Carrington (1765) 95 Eng. Rep. 807, 817; 19 Howell’s State Trials 1029,
1063 (KB).
81. See Wilkes v. Wood (1763) 98 Eng. Rep. 489, 498 (KB).
82. See generally MAURICE HENRY SMITH, THE WRITS OF ASSISTANCE CASE (1978)
(recounting the Writs of Assistance case, which challenged the authorization of customs officials
to invade private property in search of smuggled goods).
83. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001).
84. Id. at 34.
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and effects” when it amounts to the modern-day technological
equivalent of physical entry at the time of the founding. Identifying
those equivalents requires judgment, and judgment implies discretion.
But an originalist can and should adopt Katz as a way to retain the
original protections of the Fourth Amendment in a world of
technological change.85
This Part makes that argument in four steps. First, it explores the
historical disputes that inspired the passage of the Fourth Amendment.
Second, it shows how the drafting and enactment of state constitutional
equivalents and later the Fourth Amendment itself shed no useful light
on what is a search beyond those famous disputes. Third, it shows that
the same is true of the common law. Last, this Part puts the pieces
together, showing how the modern Katz doctrine is consistent with
originalism as a construction of the Fourth Amendment’s original
public meaning in light of technological change.
A. The Disputes That Inspired the Fourth Amendment Involved
Physical Entry
The first place to look for framing-era understandings of the
Fourth Amendment “search” doctrine is the major disputes that
inspired the Fourth Amendment’s passage. We know that the Fourth
Amendment was a response to a series of prominent legal disputes in
the mid-eighteenth century, both in England and in the Colonies,
primarily consisting of Entick v. Carrington,86 Wilkes v. Wood,87 and the
Writs of Assistance case.88 Those disputes inspired search and seizure
amendments in several state constitutions and then, later, in the federal
Constitution. We can look to those disputes to get an idea of what
contemporary observers would have understood the search and seizure
provisions to mean.
Two lessons emerge. First, the cases that inspired the Fourth
Amendment did not address what was a search of persons, houses,
papers, or effects. Instead, the disputes were exclusively about the
85. To use the interpretation/construction distinction favored by originalist scholars such as
Randy Barnett and Lawrence Solum, Katz is a persuasive construction of the Fourth
Amendment’s original public meaning. See, e.g., Randy E. Barnett, Interpretation and
Construction, 34 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 65, 68–72 (2011); Lawrence B. Solum, Originalism and
Constitutional Construction, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 453, 457 (2013).
86. Entick v. Carrington (1765) 95 Eng. Rep. 807, 817; 19 Howell’s State Trials 1029, 1063
(KB).
87. Wilkes v. Wood (1763) 98 Eng. Rep. 489, 490 (KB).
88. See generally SMITH, supra note 82 (recounting the Writs of Assistance case).
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lawful scope of search warrants—that is, court orders that allowed
officers to go places and remove items. Second, the disputes all arose
in the context of physical entries into enclosed spaces. Officers entered
homes and offices, rifled through a suspect’s property, and removed
possible evidence. The cases suggest that contemporary observers
would have thought of physical entry into physical spaces as the
problem that the Fourth Amendment addressed. There apparently was
no consideration of whether a broader principle was in play—or, if so,
what it might be.
Start with Entick v. Carrington. The King’s officials obtained a
warrant “to make strict and diligent search for John Entick,” and then,
upon finding him, “to seize and apprehend, and to bring [him], together
with his books and papers, in safe custody before [the Earl of Halifax,
one of the King’s principal secretaries of state] to be examined
concerning the premises, and further dealt with according to law.”89
The agents “entered the plaintiff’s dwelling-house . . . to search for and
seize the plaintiff and his books and papers in order to bring him and
them before the earl of Halifax, according to the warrant.”90 Over four
hours, the officers “broke open the doors to the rooms, the locks, iron
bars, etc. thereto affixed, and broke open the boxes, chests, drawers,
etc. of the plaintiff in his house, and broke the locks thereto affixed,
and searched and examined all the rooms, etc., in his dwelling-house,
and all the boxes, etc. so broke open, and read over, pried into and
examined all the private papers, books, etc.”91
Lord Camden condemned the general warrant used to justify the
entry and removal of property: “To search, seize, and carry away all
the papers of the subject upon the first warrant: that such a right should
have existed from the time whereof the memory of man runneth not to
the contrary, and never yet have found a place in any book of law; is
incredible.”92 The general warrant in Entick allowed “the lock and
doors of every room, box, or trunk” to be “broken open,” the court
noted.93 Imposing limits on warrants was needed so that “the secret

89.
90.
91.
92.
93.

Entick, 19 Howell’s State Trials at 1029, 1031, 1034.
Id. at 1031.
Id. at 1030.
See id. at 1068.
Id. at 1063–64.
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cabinets and bureaus of every subject in this kingdom” would not be
“thrown open to the search and inspection of a messenger.”94
Entick has often been considered the leading inspiration for the
Fourth Amendment.95 But note how it refers to searches and seizures.
It addresses them only in the context of the facts of that case, involving
direct physical entry: breaking open locks and then rifling through what
was inside and taking property there. Entick gives no guidance on
whether acts beyond physical entry might have triggered the same
concerns or been considered as part of the same problem.96 The dispute
was only about the justification needed to break open locks and enter
physical spaces.
Wilkes v. Wood, an antecedent to Entick decided by the same
judge two years earlier, provides no additional guidance about the
understanding of searches. Messengers entered Wilkes’s house with a
general warrant.97 Wilkes sued the messengers for “entering [his]
house, breaking his locks, and seizing his papers.”98 The messengers
“claimed a right, under precedents, to force persons houses, break
open [writing desks], seize their papers, &c. upon a general warrant,
where no inventory is made of the things thus taken away, and where
no offenders names are specified in the warrant[.]”99 In their view, the
messengers had “a discretionary power . . . to search wherever their
suspicions may chance to fall.”100
The court disagreed: “If such a power is truly invested in a
Secretary of State, and he can delegate this power, it certainly may
affect the person and property of every man in this kingdom, and is

94. Id. at 1063.
95. The Supreme Court set the tone for its treatment of Entick in 1886:
As every American statesmen, during our revolutionary and formative period as a
nation, was undoubtedly familiar with this monument of English freedom, and
considered it as the true and ultimate expression of constitutional law, it may be
confidently asserted that its propositions were in the minds of those who framed the
Fourth Amendment to the Constitution, and were considered as sufficiently
explanatory of what was meant by unreasonable searches and seizures.
Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 626–27 (1886).
96. See Kerr, Curious History, supra note 36, at 72–73 (observing that while Entick does
discuss the law of trespass, that does not imply that a legal trespass would be understood as
constituting a search; it seems more likely that Entick discussed the technical law of trespass
because the cause of action in Entick happened to be trespass).
97. Wilkes v. Wood (1763) 98 Eng. Rep. 489, 490 (KB).
98. Id. at 489.
99. Id. at 498.
100. Id.
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totally subversive of the liberty of the subject.”101 Like Entick, Wood
sheds no particular light on what a search of persons, houses, papers,
or effects might mean. Both cases focus on the limits of warrants to
physically enter a home. But the report of the opinion gives no sign of
how broadly the court’s concerns go, if it all, beyond physical entry.
The third major inspiration for the Fourth Amendment, the Writs
of Assistance case, is notable for its nearly singular focus on physical
entry into the home. The case was argued by James Otis in 1761 to try
to stop the practice of general warrants in the colonies.102 Although the
court rejected the argument and held the writs of assistance lawful,
Otis’s arguments against the legality of the writs were influential and
understood to have helped inspire the adoption of search and seizure
protections in state constitutions and later the federal Constitution.103
Notably, Otis’s attack on the writs of assistance focused on how they
enabled government officials to invade homes. According to the notes
that John Adams took of Otis’s arguments, Otis argued to the court
that the writ was “against the fundamental Principles of Law.—The
Priviledge of House.”104 As Otis explained weeks later, in a summary
of his arguments:
[O]ne of the most essential branches of English liberty is the freedom
of one’s house. A man’s house is his castle; and whilst he is quiet, he
is as well guarded as a prince in his castle. This writ, if it should be
declared legal, would totally annihilate this privilege. Custom-house

101. Id.
102. See generally SMITH, supra note 82 (describing how the Writs case challenged the
authorization of customs officials to invade private property). For a more accessible summary, see
also Thomas Clancy, The Framers’ Intent: John Adams, His Era, and the Fourth Amendment, 86
IND. L.J. 979, 992–1006 (2011) (explaining how the Writs case may have been the most influential
on Adams’s views).
103. The Supreme Court recalled that:
The historic occasion of that denunciation, in 1761 at Boston, has been characterized
as “perhaps the most prominent event which inaugurated the resistance of the colonies
to the oppressions of the mother country. ‘Then and there,’ said John Adams, ‘then
and there was the first scene of the first act of opposition to the arbitrary claims of
Great Britain. Then and there the child Independence was born.’”
Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 583 n.21 (1980) (citing Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616,
625 (1886)).
104. JOSIAH QUINCY, JR., REPORTS OF CASES ARGUED AND ADJUDGED IN THE SUPERIOR
COURT OF JUDICATURE OF THE PROVINCE OF MASSACHUSETTS BAY, BETWEEN 1761 AND 1772,
at 471 (1865).
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officers may enter our houses, when they please; we are commanded
to permit their entry.105

Otis also expanded on his claims in the Boston Gazette through an
article that was unsigned but nonetheless attributed to him:106
[E]very housholder in this province, will necessarily become less
secure than he was before this writ had any existence among us; for
by it, a custom house officer or ANY OTHER PERSON has a power
given him, with the assistance of a peace officer, to ENTER
FORCEABLY into a DWELLING HOUSE, and rifle every part of it
where he shall PLEASE to suspect uncustomed goods are lodgd!—
Will any man put so great a value on his freehold, after such a power
commences as he did before?—every man in this province, will be
liable to be insulted, by a petty officer, and threat[e]ned to have his
house ransack’d . . . .107

In Entick, Wilkes, and the Writs of Assistance case, the evil to be
addressed was the unlimited power of a government official to
physically enter a home and rifle through what was inside. Whether
other government wrongs outside the home might be similarly
troublesome was not addressed. Of course, the fact that the events that
inspired the Fourth Amendment all involved physical invasion of
homes does not mean that the Fourth Amendment’s scope should be
limited to physical invasion of homes. The text extends to persons,
papers, and effects, as well.108 But the disputes that inspired the Fourth
Amendment might aid in interpretation by telling us the kind of
problems that the public would have understood the Fourth
Amendment to address. Unfortunately, none offer any guidance to
what counts as a search beyond the obvious facts of physical entry into
a home.
B. The Drafting and Ratification History of the Fourth Amendment
Does Not Answer What Is A Search of Persons, Houses, Papers
and Effects
Of course, the Fourth Amendment did not merely enact Entick,
Wilkes, and Otis’s argument in the Writs of Assistance case. The Fourth
105. 2 CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS, THE WORKS OF JOHN ADAMS, SECOND PRESIDENT OF
THE UNITED STATES 524 (Boston, Charles C. Little and James Brown 1850).
106. Clancy, supra note 102, at 993.
107. QUINCY, JR., supra note 104, at 489 (cleaned up).
108. The relationship among these terms is discussed later in notes 137–141 and
accompanying text.
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Amendment has its own text. A reasonable observer at the time of the
Fourth Amendment’s ratification in 1791 would have read that text to
draw meaning from its words. That brings us to the drafting and
ratification of the Fourth Amendment. What would a reasonable
observer in 1791 have believed the limit on “searches” of “persons,
houses, papers, and effects” to be? What if any principle beyond
physical entry into particular spaces would count?
The drafting and ratification history unfortunately sheds no
particular light on this question. The materials are too sparse, and the
particular words are too general, to have a clear meaning beyond the
basic concerns from Entick, Wilkes, and Otis’s argument in the Writs of
Assistance case. We can see this by starting with the state constitutions
that served as models for the Fourth Amendment, then consider the
Fourth Amendment’s drafting history, and conclude with
contemporary dictionary definitions of the key terms.
The federal Fourth Amendment was inspired by state
constitutions that had enacted prohibitions relating to general warrants
such as those condemned in Entick and Wilkes. The first such provision
appeared in 1776 in the form of Virginia’s Declaration of Rights,
drafted by George Mason.109 It adopted a search and seizure provision
focused narrowly on prohibiting general warrants:
That general warrants, whereby any officer or messenger may be
commanded to search suspected places without evidence of a fact
committed, or to seize any person or persons not named, or whose
offense is not particularly described and supported by evidence, are
grievous and oppressive and ought not to be granted.110

The language here seems closely tied to Entick, Wilkes, and Otis’s
argument in the Writs of Assistance case. General warrants are
prohibited.
Pennsylvania’s 1776 constitution elaborated on the concept by
adding a prefatory clause. It stated:
That the people have a right to hold themselves, their houses, papers,
and possessions free from search and seizure, and therefore warrants
without oaths or affirmations first made, affording a sufficient

109.

NELSON B. LASSON, THE HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
79 (1937).
VA. DECLARATION OF RIGHTS of 1776, art. X.

TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION

110.

KERR IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

2022]

KATZ AS ORIGINALISM

1/19/2022 4:43 PM

1071

foundation for them, and whereby any officer or messenger may be
commanded or required to search suspected places, or to seize any
person or persons, his or their property, not particularly described,
are contrary to that right, and ought not to be granted.111

Unlike Virginia’s effort, the Pennsylvania text identifies what the
prohibition on general warrants would address—specifically, “a right”
of “the people” to “hold themselves, their houses, papers, and
possessions free from search and seizure.”112 Most of the language that
ended up in the Fourth Amendment can be found here. But the
primary focus on general warrants remained.
Massachusetts added a search and seizure provision in its 1780
constitution that echoed the Pennsylvanian language by stating a
general right against searches and seizures—here, for the first time,
described as a right against “unreasonable” searches and seizures—and
describing what it covered, a subject’s “person,” “houses,” “papers,”
and “all his possessions.”113 Drafted by John Adams,114 the full text
stated:
Every subject has a right to be secure from all unreasonable searches,
and seizures, of his person, his houses, his papers, and all his
possessions. All warrants, therefore, are contrary to this right, if the
cause or foundation of them be not previously supported by oath or
affirmation; and if the order in the warrant to a civil officer, to make
search in suspected places, or to arrest one or more suspected persons,
or to seize their property, be not accompanied with a special
designation of the persons or objects of search, arrest, or seizure: and
no warrant ought to be issued but in cases, and with the formalities
prescribed by the laws.115

The Massachusetts language seems largely equivalent to—if less
concise than—the Fourth Amendment that was ratified a decade or so
later.
Let’s turn to that federal effort. The direct inspiration for the
Fourth Amendment were the debates over the ratification of the U.S.
Constitution. The ratification debates led to calls for the enactment of

111.
112.
113.
114.
115.

PENN. CONST. OF 1776, art. X.
Id.
MASS. CONST. art. XIV.
Clancy, supra note 102, at 980–81.
MASS. CONST. art. XIV.
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a bill of rights resembling those in state constitutions.116 During
Virginia’s 1788 convention to vote on the ratification of the
Constitution, for example, Patrick Henry spoke against ratification in
part on the ground that the Constitution contained no protections
against unreasonable searches and seizures.117 Henry’s concerns largely
mirrored Otis’s arguments from the Writs of Assistance case in being
specifically about protecting the home.118
In response to objections such as Henry’s, the Virginia convention
that ratified the U.S. Constitution recommended in 1788 that Congress
should consider enacting a bill of rights.119 Virginia’s proposed
language for a search and seizure provision echoed the 1780
Massachusetts text, stating that “every freeman has a right to be secure
from all unreasonable searches and seizures of his person, his papers,
and property.”120 New York’s ratifying convention endorsed that
language, declaring that “every Freeman has a right to be secure from
all unreasonable searches and seizures of his person his papers or his
property.”121
This brings us, finally, to the federal Fourth Amendment. James
Madison drafted and introduced the language that would become the
Fourth Amendment.122 The version he submitted to the House of
Representatives for consideration in 1789 read as follows:
The rights of the people to be secured in their persons, their houses,
their papers, and their other property, from all unreasonable searches
and seizures, shall not be violated by warrants issued without
116. See PAULINE MAIER, RATIFICATION: THE PEOPLE DEBATE THE CONSTITUTION, 1787–
1788, at 459–64 (2010).
117. See Patrick Henry, Debates, the Virginia Convention (June 16, 1788), in 10 THE
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 1301 (John P.
Kaminski & Gaspare J. Saladino eds., State Historical Society of Wisconsin, 1993).
118. Henry argued: “Suppose an exciseman will demand leave to enter your cellar or house,
by virtue of his office; perhaps he may call on the militia to enable him to go. If Congress be
informed of it, will they give you redress?” Id. Protections were needed to prevent the exciseman
from “go[ing] into your cellars and rooms, and search[ing], ransack[ing] and measur[ing], every
thing you eat, drink and wear.” Id. at 1331.
119. 3 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE
FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 657 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 2d ed., Philadelphia, J.B. Lippincott & Co.
1888) (1836).
120. Id. at 658.
121. 23 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 2328
(John P. Kaminski et al. eds., 2009).
122. See LASSON, supra note 109, at 100 & n.77.
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probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, or not particularly
describing the places to be searched, or the persons or things to be
seized.123

Madison’s 1789 proposal broke no new ground insofar as
constitutional scope is concerned.124 The “right to be secure from all
unreasonable searches” was from the 1780 Massachusetts
constitution.125 The Massachusetts language had been recommended
by the Virginia and New York ratifying conventions in 1788.126
Madison’s initial draft also applied to “their persons, their houses, their
papers, and their other property,” which was functionally identical to
the list of protected items in the Massachusetts constitution and the
Virginia and New York recommendations.127
Madison’s initial proposal underwent only very minor changes
before being enacted. The Committee of Eleven, made up of
representatives of each state, slightly altered the language.128
Unfortunately, no explanations exist for why the changes were made.129
But three changes stand out. First, and most significantly, the phrase
“other property” was replaced with “effects.” That is, the new language
offered protection to the people in their persons, houses, papers, and
“effects” instead of in their persons, houses, papers, and “their other
property.” Dictionaries of the era defined “effects” as “personal
property, and particularly . . . goods or moveables.”130 Second, the
word “all” was removed so that the protection against “all
unreasonable searches and seizures” became a protection against
“unreasonable searches and seizures.” This was presumably a
nonsubstantive change, as the word “all” seems redundant. Finally, the
123. 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 452 (1789) (Joseph Gales ed., 1834).
124. It did break new ground in the warrant clause, however, by stating expressly that
warrants required probable cause. See LASSON, supra note 109, at 100.
125. MASS. CONST. art. XIV.
126. See supra notes 113–115, 120–121.
127. See supra notes 119–122.
128. Thomas Y. Davies, Recovering the Original Fourth Amendment, 98 MICH. L. REV. 547,
710 (1999).
129. See Davies, supra note 128, at 710–12.
130. Judge Luttig, in Altman v. City of High Point, cited the following dictionary sources:
Dictionarium Britannicum (Nathan Baily ed., 1730) (defining “effects” as “the goods
of a merchant, tradesman, & c”); Samuel Johnson, A Dictionary of the English
Language (1755) (defining the plural of “effect” as “Goods; moveables”); 1 Noah
Webster, First Edition of an American Dictionary of the English Language (1828)
(defining “effect” as “[i]n the plural, effects are goods; moveables; personal estate”).
330 F.3d 194, 201 (4th Cir. 2003).
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right to be “secured” against unreasonable searches and seizures was
rephrased as the right to be “secure” against unreasonable searches
and seizures. Again, this presumably is just a stylistic change. The end
result was the constitutional text ratified on December 15, 1791,131 that
we still have today.
Let’s return to the key question: What would an informed member
of the public conclude about the meaning of “searches” of “persons,
houses, papers, and effects” in 1791? Very little in the way of specifics,
I think. The text of the Fourth Amendment as a whole echoed existing
state constitutions in prohibiting general warrants. The famous abuses
involving general warrants were focused on physical invasion of homes.
The occasional discussion of the language hewed closely to the
animating fact patterns from Entick, Wilkes, and the Writs of Assistance
case. But there is nothing in the debates, history, or text of the Fourth
Amendment that sheds light on any specific test for what a “search” of
“persons, houses, papers, or effects” entails.
A physical intrusion into a house or person surely counted. But no
one today disputes that. The important question is what short of
physical intrusion counts. Is merely looking at a house a search?
Looking extra closely? Using technology to see what the unaided eye
could not see? Obtaining records about someone outside the home that
reveals the amount of detail about someone that could be learned by
home intrusion? These are the kinds of questions that matter. But the
road to the Fourth Amendment’s enactment seems to offer no
particular answer.
Nor do the words alone seem to shed any particular light. Take the
word “searches.” The 1775 edition of Samuel Johnson’s dictionary132
offers four meanings for the noun “search”:
1.

Inquiry by looking into every suspected place.

2.

Examination.

3.

Inquiry; act of seeking: with of, for, or after.

4.

Quest; pursuit133

131. See Raffone v. Adams, 468 F.2d 860, 864 n.4 (2d Cir. 1972) (noting the date on which the
Bill of Rights was ratified).
132. SAMUEL JOHNSON, DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (4th ed. 1775).
133. Id. (entry for “search; noun”).
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These definitions encompass a range of possible meanings. The first
definition (“Inquiry by looking into every suspected place”) suggests a
physical entry and brings to mind how the agents in Entick “broke open
the doors to the rooms” of John Entick’s house, “broke open the
boxes, . . . and broke the locks thereto affixed, and searched and
examined all the rooms.”134 The second definition (“Examination”)
suggests some sort of close look that might reveal nonobvious facts
about an item. The third definition (“Inquiry; act of seeking: with of,
for, or after”) suggests more of an effort to find, without requiring an
act of entry or approach, but also seems limited to uses paired with of,
for, or after that are absent in the constitutional text. Finally, the fourth
definition (“Quest; pursuit”) suggests more of a goal than a particular
act.
In short, the word “search” in 1775 had the same range of
meanings that it has today, from physically rifling through a place to
any effort to find something.135 The history suggests that physical entry
was the paradigmatic example that the public would have understood
by the language. That was the issue in the disputes in Entick, Wilkes,
and the Writs of Assistance case that motivated the state amendments
and then the federal Fourth Amendment. But neither the history nor
the words seem to answer whether the public would have understood
a broader concept to be appropriate as well.
It’s true we have the changes made by the Committee of Eleven,
but it seems to me that they shed no particular light. Consider how the
Committee changed what items were protected by the Fourth
Amendment, narrowing the coverage from “all property” to only
“effects.”136 That doesn’t tell us much, as the list of protected items is
an unclear mix of places that could be searched and things that could
be seized. Textually, the Fourth Amendment applies to both searches
and seizures of those items. In cases like Entick, for example, the
government searched the house and then seized the papers inside it.137
Given that context, it would not have been clear what the enumeration
of a protected item was supposed to mean. Was it a thing that could

134. Entick v. Carrington (1765) 95 Eng. Rep. 807, 807; 19 Howell’s State Trials 1029, 1030
(KB).
135. See Kerr, Curious History, supra note 36, at 70 (noting the range of textual meanings of
“search”).
136. See supra notes 129–130 and accompanying text.
137. See supra notes 89–96 and accompanying text.
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not be unreasonably searched, or an item that could not be
unreasonably seized, or both? Perhaps the change from “all property”
to “effects” was meant to limit the Fourth Amendment’s scope, as
some have claimed.138 Or perhaps it was merely a more specific
description of what property could be seized. We can’t know, and an
informed member of the public in 1791 would not have known either.
The text and history alone cannot furnish the answer.
C. The Common Law Does Not Provide the Needed Answers
Another way to determine the original public meaning might be
through a study of the common law of searches and seizures.139 The
Supreme Court has reasoned that the Fourth Amendment
incorporates some common law rules of search and seizure, especially
those found in prominent common law treatises.140 Can common law
rules shed light on what would have been understood as searches of
persons, houses, papers, or effects? Unfortunately, the common law
fails to provide those answers. The issue just didn’t come up, primarily
because the law at the time did not focus on what was a search or what
items were protected by search rules.
We can appreciate the absence of law on this issue by reviewing
the classic common law treatises often relied on by the Supreme Court
to understand common law criminal procedure rules.141 The treatises
include extensive discussion of topics that today are covered by the
Fourth Amendment. But when read today, the treatises seem oddly
limited: the discussion of search and seizure rules generally start with a
suspect’s arrest instead of with an investigation.142 That is, the rules

138.
139.

See, e.g., Davies, supra note 128, at 710–12.
See generally WILLIAM J. CUDDIHY, THE FOURTH AMENDMENT: ORIGINS AND
ORIGINAL MEANING 602–1791 (2009) (providing historical context of the Fourth Amendment
and its meaning).
140. See, e.g., Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927, 932–33 (1995) (looking to a discussion of
search and seizure law from “[s]everal prominent founding-era commentators” to help determine
that the knock-and-announce rule was sufficiently engrained in the law of search and seizure to
be considered part of the Fourth Amendment). It was not necessarily just “common law” in the
sense of caselaw, as it combined case decisions with statutes over many years. Id. at 933. This is a
striking lesson from reading the criminal procedure treatises below: the rules stated had a mix of
origins, from cases to prior treatises to then-existing practices and other treatises. See infra notes
143–60.
141. See infra notes 143–60.
142. See infra notes 143–60.
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begin when a suspect is brought into custody and the chain of events
leading to the suspect’s trial begins. The government’s investigation
leading up to the arrest—the part that we care most about today,
especially for purposes of identifying “searches”—generally doesn’t
come up.
Consider one of the most prominent period treatises, William
Hawkins’s Pleas of the Crown.143 Reading over Hawkins’s treatise,144
the materials on criminal procedure seem to modern eyes to be
conspicuously missing the investigation stage. Hawkins goes into great
detail on arrests,145 starting with arrests by private persons,146 then
arrests by public officers.147 He then has a page and a half on the rules
for breaking into houses to make arrests.148 Next, he covers the rules
for bail,149 commitment to prison,150 and liability for escaping prisons.151
But there is almost no mention of what investigative techniques are
allowed before the suspect’s arrest.152 This is of course what we care
about most today. We want to know what the police can do without
triggering the Fourth Amendment. But Hawkins says almost nothing
about the law of search and seizure before arrests occurred.
The same is true of other period treatises. Blackstone’s famous
Commentaries begins its treatment of criminal procedure with a
chapter on arrests, followed by a chapter on commitment and bail.153 It
then turns to the method of prosecution, indictments, and
arraignments.154 But there is no chapter, and no discussion, on what
criminal procedure looked like before an arrest occurred. The law was
focused on detaining suspects, interrogating them, and bringing them

143. 2 WILLIAM HAWKINS, A TREATISE OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN (6th ed. 1787).
144. I am selecting the founding-era 6th edition published in 1787, although other editions
around the same time are similar.
145. See HAWKINS, supra note 143, at xiii (“The first thing to be done in order to the bringing
a criminal to justice is to arrest him.”).
146. Id. at 115–28.
147. Id. at 128–38.
148. Id. at 138–39.
149. Id. at 140–79.
150. Id. at 179–88.
151. Id. at 190–213.
152. The only exception is a very brief mention of the Wilkes cases. See id. at 131.
153. 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 286–97 (4th ed.
1770). The arrest chapter is Chapter 21, while the commitment and bail chapter is Chapter 22. Id.
154. Id. at 298–325.
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to trial. There was no treatment of what investigative steps could be
taken before the arrest.
The closest the treatises come to explaining the rules of
investigation are the comparatively brief materials on search warrants.
Consider the 1793 edition of the four-volume treatise by Richard Burn,
The Justice of the Peace, and the Parish Officer.155 Burn’s treatise is
organized alphabetically by subject. The arrest section is eleven pages
long, and it details the rules for how arrests can be made, how much
force can be used in making arrests, and what must happen after an
arrest occurs.156 In contrast, the material on search warrants is less than
three pages long.157 It summarizes what Hawkins and the influential
English jurist Matthew Hale had written in their respective treatises
about the form and execution of warrants, and it includes a sample
search warrant form for stolen goods.158 There is no discussion of what
was considered a search.
There are two primary explanations for the absence of coverage
on investigatory law that, if it existed, might shed light on what was
understood as a search. First, modern-style law enforcement
investigations did not exist—or at least were exceedingly rare—in
1791.159 Today we have a vast law enforcement apparatus that
investigates crimes and gathers evidence. Determining what counts as
a “search” is essential in our world because it tells us what steps the
police can take before triggering constitutional rules. The police are
governed by the Fourth Amendment, and what the police can do is in
turn governed significantly by what counts as a search.
That was not true in the common law era. At that time, the role of
the state in investigating crimes was minimal. Grand juries existed, and
a part-time constable might help a private party execute a warrant for
stolen goods.160 But the notion of a full-time police officer did not arise
until the nineteenth century.161 Investigations, if they occurred, were
155. The 1793 edition is the 18th edition, edited by John Burn, the son of the original author.
1 RICHARD BURN, THE JUSTICE OF THE PEACE, AND PARISH OFFICER (18th ed. 1793).
156. Id. at 102–12.
157. Id. at vol. 4, 131–33.
158. See id.
159. See David A. Sklansky, The Private Police, 46 UCLA L. REV. 1165, 1202–08 (1999).
160. See Wesley MacNeil Oliver, The Neglected History of Criminal Procedure, 1850–1940,
62 RUTGERS L. REV. 447, 449–57 (2010).
161. See Sklansky, supra note 159.
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often conducted by the victims.162 The idea of police professionally
gathering evidence of a crime before making an arrest was foreign to
the common law. Warrants could be obtained, but generally only to
retrieve stolen goods.163 And that means that today’s critical question—
how much can the government watch and learn about a person without
triggering legal oversight—rarely arose.
A second reason the meaning of “search” did not come up was the
lack of remedies for searches. Today, a government search begets a
remedy—or at least litigation over a remedy—that marks out precise
lines of what counts as a search. A person who is searched unlawfully
has a range of remedies to pursue. If the search does not lead to
evidence, a civil suit can be filed under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 or Bivens.164 If
the search leads to evidence and charges, the person searched, now a
defendant, can file a motion to suppress. In either context, a common
threshold issue for litigation is whether a Fourth Amendment “search”
occurred. This leads to many cases on what is a search, and the volume
of cases leads to considerable clarity about what counts as one.
Such remedies were nonexistent in 1791 when the Fourth
Amendment was ratified. There was no cause of action for
unreasonable searches and seizures. The exclusionary rule was not yet
established.165 A subject of a search would need to bring a legal claim
against the government agent using some other cause of action, such as
a trespass, and the legality of the government’s act could be litigated as
a defense to liability.166 In that setting, what counted as a “search” had
no legal significance.
D. Katz and the Fourth Amendment’s Original Public Meaning
What’s the upshot of this history? The lesson, I think, is that a wellinformed member of the public at the time of the Fourth Amendment’s
adoption would have been aware that the language regulated physical

162. See MacNeil Oliver, supra note 160.
163. See id.
164. See generally Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971)
(providing an implied right of action for constitutional claims against officers).
165. The history on this question is somewhat complex, as there were hints of an exclusionary
rule beforehand. See generally Roger Roots, The Originalist Case for the Fourth Amendment
Exclusionary Rule, 45 GONZ. L. REV. 1 (2009) (arguing that the common law featured remedies
akin to the modern exclusionary rule). However, the exclusionary rule was not expressly adopted
by the Supreme Court until Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 398 (1914).
166. As the discussion in the next Part shows, this was how several of the major disputes that
led to the adoption of the Fourth Amendment arose. See infra Part II.D.
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entry into homes and other listed items such as “effects”—the facts of
Entick, Wilkes, and the Writs of Assistance case—without having a
sense of whether the language covered any broader principle or
method beyond physical entry into those spaces. Whether a broader
principle might be implicated by the Fourth Amendment’s limit on
“searches” of “persons, houses, papers, and effects,” and, if so, what it
might be, simply did not come up. Nothing in the text or history
suggested the question, much less an answer.
Times have changed. In our modern world, the Fourth
Amendment search doctrine requires a truly astonishing amount of
line drawing. Modern policing involves hundreds of different law
enforcement techniques that the government might use to gather
evidence. In a typical case, the police might consider a dizzying array
of techniques enabled by modern technology. They might follow a
suspect using a drone;167 try to see him more clearly by using binoculars;
place a GPS device on his car;168 get his cell-site records;169 ask
neighbors about him; monitor his mail; tap his phone;170 collect his
credit card records; search his car; Google him; go undercover to obtain
intimate information;171 and try many other methods. Any Fourth
Amendment search doctrine must say which of these technologyenhanced techniques are searches under the Fourth Amendment.
What is an originalist to do? I offer a modest suggestion. Because
the new fact patterns requiring answers generally involve new practices
and new technologies, and technology can threaten to cut back on the
amount of protection that a prior rule guarantees, an originalist seeking
a rule that can stand the test of time—that will not threaten the
meaning of the Fourth Amendment as technology changes—may seek
an approach that aims to provide for technological neutrality. As
Justice Scalia explained in Kyllo v. United States, the Fourth

167. Cf. United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 281 (1983) (“A person traveling in an
automobile on public thoroughfares has no reasonable expectation of privacy in his movements
from one place to another.”).
168. See, e.g., United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 402, 412 (2012) (holding that secretly
installing a GPS device on a suspect’s car is a Fourth Amendment search).
169. See Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2211, 2221 (2018) (holding that
compelling at least seven days of cell-site records is a Fourth Amendment search).
170. See, e.g., Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 348 (1967).
171. See, e.g., Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 302, 311 (1966) (holding that such conduct
is not an unreasonable search subject to Fourth Amendment protections).
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Amendment should be interpreted to “assure[] preservation of that
degree of privacy against government that existed when the Fourth
Amendment was adopted.”172
From this perspective, an originalist seeking to interpret the
Fourth Amendment might seek a rule of equivalence: the Fourth
Amendment should protect against the physical entry that was the
focus of Entick, Wilkes, and the Writs of Assistance case as well as their
modern-day technological equivalents. The question might be this:
Given that society uses new technologies in new ways, what kinds of
surveillance techniques are the current-day equivalents of physical
entry into houses, persons, papers, and effects, that should be treated
as searches to maintain the role of the Fourth Amendment as
technology changes?
As Part I explained, that is precisely the test that Katz provides.
Properly understood, the reasonable expectation of privacy test is not
a free-floating test into what seems private.173 As a close reading of
Justice Harlan’s concurrence shows, Katz is about identifying which
spaces are home-like, or like repositories of protected effects and
papers, based on an understanding of how society uses different spaces
and how information is stored.174 From this perspective, the Katz test
offers a sound construction of the Fourth Amendment search test. Katz
looks for an equivalent violation to physical entry: a place is protected
by the Fourth Amendment when “society is prepared to recognize”175
an expectation of privacy as “reasonable” because the judgment of
what spaces are modern-day “persons, houses, papers, and effects”176
is not simply a matter of property law.
And in a technological world, the judgment of what counts as a
sufficient invasion of that thing to be called a “search” cannot readily
be reduced to a simple rule. It requires an assessment of what rises to
the modern equivalent of a home invasion or an analogous search of
effects, or papers, or persons. That can change as society changes,
which was the core issue in Katz itself. Recall that Katz involved
placing a microphone on the top of a phone booth to listen to a
suspect’s conversations inside. The first issue in Katz was whether a

172.
173.
174.
175.
176.

Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 34 (2001).
See supra Part I.B.
See supra Part I.C.
Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
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person using a phone booth to place a call is entitled to constitutional
protection. The question, put another way, was whether the public in
1967 used phone booths in a way that made searching a phone booth
to listen to private calls the modern equivalent of searching a home,
effects, or papers.
This does not require that the place searched must physically
resemble a home. Consider Ex parte Jackson from 1878,177 almost a
century before Katz, in which the Supreme Court concluded that
sealed postal letters were entitled to Fourth Amendment protection
during transmission through the postal network.178 “Whilst in the mail,”
the Court reasoned, sealed letters were entitled to the same protection
against searches as “papers [that] are subjected to search in one’s own
household.”179 The post office obviously was not a person’s home. But
whether a sealed letter was inside a home or being carried by a
government official entrusted to deliver it without opening it, made no
difference. Breaking through the seal of the envelope “invade[d] the
secrecy of letters” in the same way “wherever they may be.”180 The
nature of the invasion was the same, as the entrusting of a private letter
with a postal carrier did not yield any rights to open the letter.181
The Supreme Court’s caselaw applying the Katz reasonable
expectation of privacy test can be broadly reconciled with this
equivalence understanding. Standing across the street and directing a
thermal imaging device to learn the temperature of the inside of a
house is akin to a home entry because it reveals details of the home.182
As long as the government avoids the space right near the home, it is
177. Ex parte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727 (1878).
178. Id. at 733.
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. It’s true that the Fourth Amendment expressly protects “papers,” a textual hook that
Jackson also notes. Id. at 733 (“The constitutional guaranty of the right of the people to be secure
in their papers against unreasonable searches and seizures extends to their papers, thus closed
against inspection, wherever they may be.”). But Jackson also stressed that the same “papers”
received no Fourth Amendment protection if they were unsealed or otherwise “open to
inspection” by postal carriers. Id. The fact that the letters were “papers” was not enough: for “the
great principle embodied in the fourth amendment of the Constitution” to apply, the letters had
to be carried with the understanding that they would “be kept free from inspection.” Id. The
shared understanding that the postal service was not supposed to open the letters was essential to
Fourth Amendment protection. This is the reasonable expectation of privacy concept in all but
name.
182. See Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 40 (2001).
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merely observing from outside, and no search occurs (the so-called
open-fields doctrine).183 A person does not retain Fourth Amendment
rights in what they knowingly disclose to others (the so-called “thirdparty doctrine”).184 Placing a beeper in someone’s property that reveals
where they are in their home is a search.185 All of these cases are
consistent with the notion of Katz as a modern-day technological
equivalence test that roughly maintains prior levels of Fourth
Amendment rights as technology changes.
From this perspective, Katz can be understood as an originalist
search inquiry that internalizes equilibrium adjustment.186 When the
Supreme Court engages in equilibrium adjustment, it adjusts the scope
of Fourth Amendment protections as technology and social practice
change to maintain the role of the Fourth Amendment over time.187
The reasonable expectation of privacy test serves this function for
searches: in effect, it interprets “persons, houses, papers, and effects”
at a level of generality that enables the Supreme Court to identify
current technological equivalents of framing-era invasions. The facts of
the present are very different from those in 1791. But Katz enables the
original role of the Fourth Amendment’s search doctrine to be
maintained as new technologies and social practices alter the dynamics
of government investigations.
The body of Fourth Amendment search caselaw is vast, and no
single theory can explain every case. This prompts the question, are
there any prominent cases inconsistent with my approach? The
reasoning of Illinois v. Caballes188—although not necessarily its
result—is one candidate. Caballes held that using a drug-sniffing dog
outside of a car to smell for illegal drugs inside the car is not a search.189
The Court reasoned that the sniff would not reveal a fact that justified
privacy protection: it could reveal only the presence or absence of

183. See United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294, 300 (1987).
184. See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 743–44 (1979).
185. See United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 719 (1984).
186. See generally Orin S. Kerr, An Equilibrium-Adjustment Theory of the Fourth
Amendment, 125 HARV. L. REV. 476, 480 (2011) (introducing the theory of equilibriumadjustment).
187. See id. at 480–88.
188. Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405 (2005).
189. Id. at 410 (“A dog sniff conducted during a concededly lawful traffic stop that reveals
no information other than the location of a substance that no individual has any right to possess
does not violate the Fourth Amendment.”).
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contraband, neither of which were private facts that alone justified
constitutional protection.190
Under my approach, Caballes should have focused instead on
whether a dog sniffing the air in a public place near the suspect’s
“effect” of the car was a virtual entry into that effect.191 The result in
Caballes seems at least plausible from that perspective. The odor of
marijuana reflected marijuana particles in the air, and it was detected
in a public place without entry or learning anything about what was
exclusively inside the car.192 In my view, Caballes should have focused
on whether the effect was effectively intruded upon and not whether
the facts learned were sufficiently private. But this is a quibble as to
reasoning rather than result. And it is only one case in an ocean of
Fourth Amendment rulings that is overwhelmingly consistent with the
textualist and originalist understanding of Katz.
III. RESPONSES TO PROPOSED TEXTUALIST AND ORIGINALIST
ALTERNATIVES TO KATZ
Prominent judges and scholars have recently advocated replacing
Katz with textualist or originalist alternatives. This Part addresses
those alternatives. It contends that the purported textualist or
originalist alternatives to Katz are no more textualist or originalist than
Katz. In several cases, the proclaimed alternatives are Katz in disguise,
rejecting Katz in form but embracing Katz in substance. And in other
cases, purportedly originalist alternatives to Katz reflect considerable
departures from history unpersuasively presented as originalist.
This Part takes on four of the prominent alternatives: two from
Justices, and two from scholars. The first is Justice Antonin Scalia’s
trespass or physical intrusion test adopted by the Court in United States

190. Id. at 409–10.
191. A car, the Supreme Court has held, is an “effect.” See United States v. Jones, 565 U.S.
400, 404 (2012) (“It is beyond dispute that a vehicle is an ‘effect’ as that term is used in the
Amendment.”).
192. The opposite result is also plausible, I think. The dog’s unusual olfactory powers could
be seen as a technological tool to virtually expose what is in the car. See Florida v. Jardines, 569
U.S. 1, 12 (2013) (Kagan, J., concurring) (describing a drug-sniffing dog as “a super-sensitive
instrument, which [the police] deployed to detect things inside that they could not perceive
unassisted”).

KERR IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

2022]

KATZ AS ORIGINALISM

1/19/2022 4:43 PM

1085

v. Jones193 and Florida v. Jardines.194 The second is Justice Neil
Gorsuch’s approach articulated in his dissenting opinion in Carpenter
v. United States.195 The third is Professor Jeffrey Bellin’s recent
argument in favor of Fourth Amendment textualism.196 Each of these
theories is easily reconciled with Katz. The last alternative considered
is the positive law model of the Fourth Amendment offered by
Professors Will Baude and James Stern,197 which is difficult to see as
originalist.
A. Justice Scalia’s Alternatives in Jones and Jardines
Justice Scalia was an early and strong critic of the Katz test, and
late in his career he led the Court in recognizing an alternative. But a
close look at the alternative—or really, the two alternatives—shows
that they are hardly a departure from Katz. Scalia rephrased the Katz
inquiry, but his two alternatives are not obvious departures from the
Katz test.
Start with United States v. Jones. Agents placed a GPS device on
the underbody of a car Antoine Jones drove and tracked his location
for twenty-eight days.198 Writing for the Court, Scalia reasoned that a
search occurred because “[t]he [g]overnment “physically occupied
private property for the purpose of obtaining information.”199
Although the facts were modern, “such a physical intrusion would have
been considered a ‘search’ within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment when it was adopted,” he concluded, citing Entick.200
Scalia reasoned that a historical strand of the search inquiry was
“exclusively property-based,”201 and in particular was based on
“common-law trespass.”202 Attaching a GPS device to the “effect”203 of
a car was “trespassory,”204 Scalia reasoned, and doing so with the intent

193.
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.

Jones, 565 U.S. at 406–08.
Jardines, 569 U.S. at 5.
Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2261–72 (2018) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
See Bellin, supra note 11, at 237–40.
See Baude & Stern, supra note 11, at 1825–26.
Jones, 565 U.S. at 403.
Id. at 404.
Id. at 404–05.
See id. at 405.
Id.
See id. at 411.
See id. at 409.
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to obtain information rendered it a search.205 And all of this was outside
the Katz reasonable expectation of privacy test, Scalia insisted: “[T]he
Katz reasonable-expectation-of-privacy test has been added to, not
substituted for, the common-law trespassory test.”206
But how different is Scalia’s trespass test in Jones from Katz itself?
The two cases are strikingly similar. In Katz, the FBI taped a
microphone to a phone booth to listen to conversations. In Jones,
agents fastened a GPS device to a car to record its whereabouts. In
both cases, there was a physical intrusion into a constitutionally
protected item. The phone booth became Katz’s protected space while
he made the call by placing the coin in the phone and using it with the
phone company’s permission, just like the car was Jones’s effect when
he borrowed it from his wife with her permission.207 Katz was not
written in a textually focused way. Jones was. But the two cases are
close cousins. Jones could have been written as a Katz case as easily as
Katz could have been written as a Jones case.
Further, Jones’s apparent foundation in pre-Katz common law
turns out to be faulty. As I have detailed at length in prior scholarship,
there was no common law trespass test before Katz.208 The caselaw
before Katz relied on a mix of privacy and property reasoning that
largely echoes the Katz era.209 The first Supreme Court decision to
apply a common law trespass test was Jones itself.210 And even if such
a test existed, Jones does not explain why installing a GPS device on
Jones’s car would have been a common law trespass. That conclusion
is simply announced, not analyzed. How far Jones differs from Katz
remains unclear.
Scalia next applied his approach in Florida v. Jardines.211 Officers
walked a drug-sniffing dog up onto the porch and front door of a home
in an effort to sniff for narcotics inside.212 Writing for the Court, Scalia
held that a search occurred because officers “physically intrud[ed] on”
a “constitutionally protected area[]” outside of any “implied
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.

See id. at 404.
Id. at 409.
See id. at 402 (noting that the car was “registered to Jones’s wife”).
See Kerr, Curious History, supra note 36, at 70–90.
See id.
See id. at 69.
Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. 1, 10–11 (2013).
Id. at 3–4.
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license.”213 Because the porch was part of the curtilage of the home, an
area traditionally considered part of the home, walking up onto the
porch was a physical intrusion into the home.214 And because there was
no “customary invitation” for “a trained police dog to explore the area
around the home in hopes of discovering incriminating evidence,” the
conduct exceeded any implied license and was a Fourth Amendment
search.215
Two things stand out about Jardines. First, its failure to mention
trespass leaves the doctrine especially muddled. Jones focused on
“common-law trespass” but also mentioned “physical intrusion.” This
suggested that the search test was probably common-law trespass, of
which physical intrusion was an example. But it left uncertain whether
the test might simply be physical intrusion. In contrast, Jardines speaks
exclusively of physical intrusion and never mentions trespass. It’s not
obvious what to make of the terminological switch. Perhaps the test
that emerges from Jones and Jardines is just physical intrusion, with
Katz bolstering the search test to cover technologically enhanced
equivalents such as Kyllo’s thermal imaging surveillance that revealed
details of the inside of the home.216 Or perhaps the Jones/Jardines test
is an independent trespass test, using some version of trespass
doctrine,217 that will also encompass acts of physical intrusion.
Second, the Jardines “implied license” test closely resembles the
societal expectations inquiry from Katz.218 Katz asks what “society is
prepared to recognize as ‘reasonable,’”219 while Jardines asks judges to
identify “customary invitation[s]”220 based on “the habits of the
country.”221 If there are any differences, they are modest ones. As
Justice Elena Kagan noted in her Jardines concurrence, deciding the
Jardines’ case on Katz grounds “would have looked . . . well, much like
this one.”222 Given that property and privacy interests in a home tend

213. Id.
214. Id. at 6–7.
215. Id. at 9.
216. See Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 29–30 (2001).
217. See Kerr, Curious History, supra note 36, at 90–93 (exploring the uncertainty about what
trespass test applies under Jones).
218. See Jardines, 569 U.S. at 10.
219. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
220. Jardines, 569 U.S. at 9.
221. Id. at 8 (quoting McKee v. Gratz, 260 U.S. 127, 136 (1922)).
222. Id. at 13 (Kagan, J., concurring).
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to match, a decision framed one way “runs mostly along the same
path”223 as a decision framed the other way.
Viewing the cases together, it is not clear how much or even
whether Jones and Jardines differ from Katz. Although Jones and
Jardines were written to be distinct from Katz, their overlap in practice
is substantial. The facts of Jones closely resemble the facts of Katz, and
the special expectations language from Katz closely resembles the
implied license inquiry from Jardines. Indeed, almost a decade after
Jones and Jardines, it is still difficult to identify situations in which their
introduction actually changed the outcome of any cases. Jones and
Jardines give courts a second ground to consider when evaluating what
is a Fourth Amendment search, but the difference between that and
Katz may be more of form than substance.224
The similarities between Katz and Jones/Jardines suggest two
possible reconciliations. As noted above, perhaps they are just two
sides of the same coin: Jones and Jardines cover physical intrusion,
while Katz expands beyond physical intrusion to include its
technologically enhanced functional equivalents. Alternatively,
perhaps Jones and Jardines adopt a particular approach to trespass that
acts as a property-based variant of Katz. On that view, perhaps Jones
and Jardines are a particular rule-based fulfillment of Katz’s traditional
respect for property law.225 However the cases are reconciled, we are
playing variations on a theme rather than a new melody.

223. Id. at 14.
224. Notable cases that have found rights under Jones/Jardines but not Katz have tended to
be ones where both are close calls. For example, United States v. Dixon, 984 F.3d 814, 819–20 (9th
Cir. 2020), ruled that inserting a key in a lock is a search under a Jones property-analysis even
though earlier circuit precedent had held that it was not a search under Katz. This is a hard issue
under both frameworks, however, and for similar reasons. Under Jones/Jardines, the question is
whether inserting the key is beyond the implied license. See supra text accompanying notes 211–
215. Under Katz, the analogous question is whether the inside of the lock is deemed exposed or
hidden based on social norms and practices. See, e.g., United States v. Lyons, 898 F.2d 210, 212
(1st Cir. 1990) (noting that “because public exposure vitiates any reasonable expectation of
privacy[,] . . . whether trying the key in order to identify the lock’s owner was a ‘search’ is a tricky
question”). As in Jardines, the inquiries are similar.
225. See, e.g., Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 143 n.12 (1978) (“One of the main rights
attaching to property is the right to exclude others, see W. Blackstone, Commentaries, Book 2,
ch. 1, and one who owns or lawfully possesses or controls property will in all likelihood have a
legitimate expectation of privacy by virtue of this right to exclude.”).
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B. Justice Gorsuch’s Approach in Carpenter
We turn next to Justice Neil Gorsuch’s separate opinion in
Carpenter v. United States. In Carpenter, the Court applied the
reasonable expectation of privacy test to hold that compelling a cell
service provider to disclose at least seven days’ worth of a person’s
historical cell-site location records was a Fourth Amendment search.226
Gorsuch filed a dissent to the Court’s reasoning rather than to its
result.227 Gorsuch’s opinion has two parts that are relevant to this
Article. First, he rejected Katz on the ground that it was not consistent
with originalism.228 Second, he proposed that courts should adopt a new
Fourth Amendment search test that would be consistent with an
originalist approach.229 A close look at Gorsuch’s opinion suggests,
however, that his quest to find an originalist standard leads back where
he started. Gorsuch’s insights into what an originalist search test might
look like ends up inadvertently calling for the adoption of Katz.
Gorsuch’s critique of Katz starts with familiar ground. Instead of
basing Fourth Amendment law on real law, Gorsuch argues, the
Supreme Court in Katz “chose . . . to protect privacy in some ethereal
way dependent on judicial intuitions.”230 Gorsuch acknowledges that
he was not sure if the test was descriptive or normative: Did it ask,
“what privacy expectations do people actually have” or “what
expectations should they have?”231 But either is problematic, in his
view. If the test is descriptive, it is a failure. Judges do not know what
expectations of privacy people actually have, and therefore often apply
the test incorrectly.232 And if the test is normative, then it is a “pure

226. See Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2217 (2018) (“[W]e hold that an
individual maintains a legitimate expectation of privacy in the record of his physical movements
as captured through CSLI. The location information obtained from Carpenter’s wireless carriers
was the product of a search.” (footnote omitted)).
227. Justice Gorsuch contended that the petitioner had waived the claim that collecting cellsite location information was a search for any reason other than that it violated a reasonable
expectation of privacy under Katz. See id. at 2272 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting). Because Gorsuch
rejected Katz, the sole issue he saw as before the Court, he dissented. Gorsuch then offered
thoughts on what a non-Katz Fourth Amendment search test might have looked like had the
Court been able to reach it. See id. Because Gorsuch’s approach seems sympathetic to the result
reached by the majority, his opinion is technically a dissent but reads more like a concurrence.
228. See id. at 2264.
229. See id. at 2267–68.
230. See id. at 2264–65.
231. Id. at 2265.
232. Id.
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policy choice . . . that calls for the exercise of raw political will
belonging to legislatures, not the legal judgment proper to courts.”233
So what should be applied instead of Katz? Gorsuch starts on solid
ground with text and history. The framers were inspired by Entick,
Wilkes, and the Writs of Assistance case, which led them to choose “to
protect privacy in particular places and things—‘persons, houses,
papers, and effects’—and against particular threats—‘unreasonable’
governmental ‘searches and seizures.’”234 So far, so good. But then
Justice Gorsuch claims that before Katz came around, there was a real
constitutional test for what was a search:
From the founding until the 1960s, the right to assert a Fourth
Amendment claim didn’t depend on your ability to appeal to a judge’s
personal sensibilities about the “reasonableness” of your
expectations or privacy. It was tied to the law.235

Gorsuch cites United States v. Jones236 and Florida v. Jardines237 in
support of his claim that the Fourth Amendment used to be “tied to
the law.”238 According to Gorsuch, Jones and Jardines reflected a
“traditional approach,” “[t]rue to th[e] words” of the Fourth
Amendment “and their original understanding,” that “asked if a house,
paper or effect was yours under law.”239
But what exactly was this “traditional approach” that was “true”
to the text and the original understanding? Here’s the tricky part. After
confidently announcing that a real originalist and textualist test had
existed, Gorsuch can’t come up with a description of it. Instead, he
presents the traditional test as a puzzle left to be solved in the future:
Given the prominence Katz has claimed in our doctrine, American
courts are pretty rusty at applying the traditional approach to the
Fourth Amendment. We know that if a house, paper, or effect is
yours, you have a Fourth Amendment interest in its protection. But
what kind of legal interest is sufficient to make something yours? And
what source of law determines that? Current positive law? The
233.
234.
235.
236.
237.
238.
239.

Id.
Id. at 2264.
Id. at 2267.
United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400 (2012).
Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. 1 (2013).
Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2267 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
Id. at 2267–68.
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common law at 1791, extended by analogy to modern times? Both?
. . . Much work is needed to revitalize this area and answer these
questions. I do not begin to claim all the answers today, but (unlike
with Katz) at least I have a pretty good idea what the questions are.240

Gorsuch presents this inability to state the traditional test as
judicial modesty. “American courts are pretty rusty at applying” the
test, he contends, and “[m]uch work is needed to revitalize this area
and answer” what the test is.241 But legal doctrine isn’t like muscle
memory that needs revitalization after a period of dormancy. If there
was a test as a matter of history, every resource explaining it is a few
keystrokes away. This Article has shown the real challenge Gorsuch
confronted in Carpenter: there simply is no “traditional approach” to
apply other than Katz itself. The Katz test that Gorsuch rejected is
entirely consistent with the history and text that Gorsuch is hoping to
follow.
We can see this problem in Gorsuch’s subsequent explanation of
the factors that he thinks should go into this traditional test. They turn
out to be the same questions and factors the Supreme Court has
considered when interpreting Katz. After scoffing at Katz as mere
judicial invention, Gorsuch introduces a few notions of his own that
strongly echo Katz. These suggestions are best understood not as
replacements for Katz but as a reframing of it using more explicitly
textual and historical language. Bringing out the historical and textual
basis of Katz seems helpful; indeed, it is a large part of the goal of this
Article. But it’s helpful to understand that Gorsuch’s effort is repeating
Katz, not replacing it.
Consider the guidance that Gorsuch offers. First, “complete
ownership or exclusive control of property” should probably not be a
“necessary condition to the assertion of a Fourth Amendment right.”242
For a home, for example, something less than “fee simple title”
suffices: “People call a house ‘their’ home when legal title is in the
bank, when they rent it, and even when they merely occupy it rent
free.”243 He writes, “[t]hat is why tenants and resident family

240.
241.
242.
243.

Id. at 2268.
Id.
Id. at 2269.
Id. (citing Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 95–96 (1998) (Scalia, J., concurring)).
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members—though they have no legal title—have standing to complain
about searches of the houses in which they live.”244
This is true, of course, under Katz. In applying Katz, the Supreme
Court has considered whether a person has enough of a relationship
with the property for it to be considered theirs.245 For example, in
Minnesota v. Olson,246 an overnight guest was deemed to have a
reasonable expectation of privacy because prevailing social norms
recognize that the overnight guest is ordinarily treated as a person who
(temporarily) lives there.247 And of course this was exactly the problem
that Katz answered: How much relationship did Charlie Katz need to
have Fourth Amendment rights in the telephone booth? The answer
was when the booth was effectively his: when he “occupies [the phone
booth], shuts the door behind him, and pays the toll that permits him
to place a call.”248
Gorsuch next contends that if you ask someone to hold your
property for you, you should maintain Fourth Amendment rights in
that property.249 This is a common law bailment, Gorsuch contends,
and Fourth Amendment law should recognize that common law
principle.250 But it already does, under Katz. If you ask a friend to hold
your bag, you retain a reasonable expectation of privacy in it.251 Same
if you leave a bag with a grocery store clerk while you go shopping,252
or at a baggage counter if you leave it there.253 You retain a reasonable
expectation of privacy as long as you keep the contents of the bag
hidden from the person holding it. This is the same principle underlying
Ex parte Jackson from 1878, the postal mail case discussed earlier: the

244. Id. at 2269–70.
245. See, e.g., Minnesota v. Olson, 495 U.S. 91, 93, 96–97 (1990).
246. Id.
247. See id. at 99 (“[W]hen the host is away or asleep, the guest will have a measure of control
over the premises. . . . [I]t is unlikely that [the host] will admit someone who wants to see or meet
with the guest over the objection of the guest.”).
248. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 352 (1967).
249. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2270 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
250. See id. at 2268–69.
251. See United States v. Presler, 610 F.2d 1206, 1213–14 (4th Cir. 1979) (finding a reasonable
expectation of privacy in locked briefcases stored with the defendant’s friend for safekeeping).
252. See United States v. Most, 876 F.2d 191, 192, 197–98 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (finding a
reasonable expectation of privacy in the contents of a plastic bag left with a grocery store clerk).
253. See United States v. Barry, 853 F.2d 1479, 1481–83 (8th Cir. 1988) (finding a reasonable
expectation of privacy in a locked suitcase stored at an airport baggage counter).
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condition that the holder cannot inspect the contents of the sealed item
results in full retention of Fourth Amendment rights.254
Gorsuch next suggests that “positive law may help provide
detailed guidance on evolving technologies.”255 By positive law,
Gorsuch means legal principles outside Fourth Amendment law, such
as statutory privacy laws.256 Looking to outside law for guidance on
what counts as a search “may be appropriate for the Fourth
Amendment.”257 But it already is, under Katz. As I have explained in
depth elsewhere,258 the “positive law model” is an existing approach to
interpreting Katz. Under this approach, courts sometimes argue that
existing statutes or the common law help define reasonable
expectations of privacy.259 Gorsuch’s new suggestion has long been part
of the Katz test.
Gorsuch finally warns that reliance on positive law perhaps should
not always matter, even if it is possibly relevant. “[W]hile positive law
may help establish a person’s Fourth Amendment interest,” he writes,
“there may be some circumstances where positive law cannot be used
to defeat it.”260 In particular, legislatures should not be able to legislate
away Fourth Amendment privacy interests. Regardless of positive law,
the Fourth Amendment should protect the “modern analogues” to
“the specific rights known at the founding,”261 such as entry into a
home. Again, this already is the case under Katz. And the notion of
considering positive law and rejecting efforts to legislate away privacy
is already found in the Katz caselaw.262
Katz has long been portrayed as a nontextual, nonoriginalist
decision. We can understand why an originalist such as Gorsuch would
disapprove of the way Katz is expressed. But it is telling that when
254. See supra notes 178–181 and accompanying text (discussing Ex parte Jackson, 96 U.S.
727 (1877)).
255. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2270 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
256. See id.
257. Id.
258. Orin S. Kerr, Four Models of Fourth Amendment Protection, 60 STAN. L. REV. 503, 516–
18 (2007) [hereinafter Kerr, Four Models].
259. See id.
260. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2270 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
261. Id. at 2271.
262. See Kerr, Four Models, supra note 258, at 516–18; see also Orin S. Kerr, The Effect of
Legislation on Fourth Amendment Protection, 115 MICH. L. REV. 1117, 1125–35 (2017) (discussing
how existing caselaw approaches the impact of legislation on the scope of Fourth Amendment
protection).
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Gorsuch has the opportunity to chart out what a textualist, originalist
Fourth Amendment search doctrine would look like, he offers a string
of principles that largely encapsulates the Katz doctrine. A close
engagement with text and history leads us back to Katz.263
C. Professor Bellin’s Fourth Amendment Textualism
We turn now to scholarly alternatives to Katz, and in particular,
scholarly alternatives to Katz that are framed as originalist or
textualist. The first example is articulated in Professor Jeffrey Bellin’s
recent article, “Fourth Amendment Textualism.”264 Although
presented as a first-principles rethinking of Fourth Amendment law in
contrast to the “made-up” and unpredictable Katz test, Bellin’s textual
and historical approach replicates existing doctrine under the
reasonable expectation of privacy test. Much like Gorsuch’s opinion in
Carpenter, Bellin’s textualist and originalist alternative to Katz ends up
taking us back to Katz.
Bellin’s criticism of Katz resembles Gorsuch’s. You know the
argument by now: the doctrine is entirely circular, leaves each decision
to the policy whims of judges, and has no historical or textual basis.265
In its place, Bellin argues that courts should root Fourth Amendment
law in the text of the Fourth Amendment as interpreted by its
founding-era history.266 According to Bellin, a textual and historical
approach produces clear and stable answers firmly rooted in the law.267
Bellin interprets the Fourth Amendment textually in three parts:
first, he covers “searches”; second, he addresses “persons, houses,
papers, and effects”; and third, he includes the limit of the word
“their.” To arrive at a textual definition of searches, Bellin reviews the
263. Professor Laura K. Donohue’s effort to use the concepts from Justice Gorsuch’s
Carpenter opinion to craft a new search test inadvertently echoes the point. See Laura K.
Donohue, Functional Equivalence and Residual Rights Post-Carpenter: Framing a Test Consistent
with Precedent and Original Meaning, 2018 SUP. CT. REV. 347, 389, 400. After working through
Gorsuch’s approach and largely endorsing and expanding upon his insights, Donohue arrives at
“a property-based approach, which, happily, is compatible with both precedent and the original
meaning of the text.” Id. at 408. If precedent, original meaning, and a Gorsuch-based property
approach are all “compatible,” this seems to be a debate more about form than substance.
264. Bellin, supra note 11.
265. See id. at 243, 251, 253–54, 282.
266. See id. at 238 (“All the Court needs is a dictionary, a touch of history, and some common
sense.”).
267. See id. at 282.
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framing-era history of search doctrine (such as Entick, Wilkes, and the
Writs of Assistance case) and framing-era dictionaries. These materials
suggest a definition, Bellin argues: “A ‘search,’ as contemplated in the
Fourth Amendment, is an examination of an object or space to uncover
information.”268 “[E]xamination,” in Bellin’s view, includes (a)
“open[ing] [an item] and look[ing] inside” and (b) any physical
“manipulation of an item,” but (c) does not include a mere “gaze in the
direction of a phenomenon of interest.”269
Applying these principles brings Bellin to a few conclusions. A
Fourth Amendment search occurs in a few important situations: “when
police enter residences, offices, and cars looking for information”;
“when they look inside a bag, pat down someone’s pockets, or
manipulate a smart phone to access the data inside”; when they use
“metal detectors or heat sensors”; when they “[t]ap[] into wires to
access digital information”; and when they “intercept electronic signals
travelling through the air.”270
Of course, a person’s Fourth Amendment rights are only
implicated when a search is of their person, house, papers, or effect.
These must be defined as well. The meaning of “persons” is obvious,
Bellin contends. As a result, “[w]hen police look inside a body cavity,
take blood or fingerprints, scrape a cheek for a DNA sample, or
administer a breathalyzer test, they conduct a search of the ‘person.’”271
“Houses” should include both dwellings and “a whole host of homelike settings,”272 including the curtilage around the house.273 The term
“papers” must be “updated to capture modern practice,”274 Bellin
argues, so it includes the contents of all electronic communications but
not metadata about those communications.275 And “effects” should, as
a matter of history, be defined as “all moveable personal property,”276
which would include luggage, computers, and electronic data.

268. Id. at 257.
269. Id.
270. Id. at 259.
271. Id. at 260.
272. Id. at 262 (quoting Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, The Internet of Things and the Fourth
Amendment of Effects, 104 CALIF. L. REV. 805, 857 (2016)).
273. Id.
274. Id. at 261.
275. See id. at 261–62 (“By contrast, electronic information that is not consciously
communicated or stored . . . would not constitute one’s ‘papers.’”).
276. Id. at 265.

KERR IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

1096

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

1/19/2022 4:43 PM

[Vol. 71:1047

Bellin’s final textual lesson is that the possessive “their” that limits
the protection of persons, houses, papers and effects is a textual
directive that Fourth Amendment rights are personal.277 On its face,
Fourth Amendment protections for people only apply to a search of
“their” items. Bellin argues that this explains and justifies both Fourth
Amendment standing doctrine,278 as well as the basic contours of the
third-party doctrine, which holds that a person lacks Fourth
Amendment rights in what they have voluntarily disclosed to third
parties.279 Echoing a point Justice Clarence Thomas and I have both
made,280 Bellin reasons that when a person discloses information to a
third party, a search of the third party is ordinarily a search of that third
party, not the discloser.281
At this point you may be wondering: How far from Katz is this?
And there’s the rub. Although Bellin intends his textual approach as a
replacement for Katz, it reconstructs Katz almost perfectly. Bellin’s
theory of what the Fourth Amendment would mean if it were only
interpreted consistently with its history and text from first principles
ends up describing current law almost exactly. His definition of what is
a search neatly matches Katz and its progeny. His definitions of
persons, houses, papers, and effects are also perfect matches with
current law. And his reliance on the possessive “their” is a match, too.
The results Bellin advocates for under his textualist and originalist
approach are strikingly similar to what the Supreme Court has
produced by applying Katz.
This is not just a coincidence. Bellin has not so much replaced Katz
as he has inadvertently demonstrated the thesis of this Article: Katz is
277. Id. at 266–72.
278. This point was made long ago by Justice Scalia, then joined by Justice Thomas. See
Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 92 (1998) (Scalia, J., concurring) (“The obvious meaning of the
provision is that each person has the right to be secure against unreasonable searches and seizures
in his own person, house, papers, and effects.”). Justice Thomas has made the same point more
recently, joined by Justice Gorsuch. See Byrd v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 1518, 1532 (2018)
(Thomas, J., concurring).
279. See supra note 184 and accompanying text.
280. See generally Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2235 (2018) (Thomas, J.,
dissenting) (arguing that cellphone metadata generated by service providers belongs to the
provider and not the end user); Orin Kerr, Opinion, How Should An Originalist Rule in the Fourth
Amendment Cell Site Case?, WASH. POST: VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (June 13, 2017),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2017/06/13/how-should-an-originalistrule-in-the-fourth-amendment-cell-site-case [https://perma.cc/SVK5-6S4W] (arguing that phone
records are not the “papers” or “effects” of the customer but rather of the service provider).
281. See Bellin, supra note 11, at 268–69.
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easily understood as both originalist and textualist. A self-consciously
textualist or originalist methodology leads you right back to Katz. Both
Bellin and I would like the Supreme Court to interpret the Fourth
Amendment in a way consistent with its text and original public
meaning, and I suspect we would both be satisfied if the Supreme Court
were to write its Fourth Amendment opinions in a more explicitly
textualist and originalist way. But where we differ is whether that
requires a change in substance or a change in form. In Bellin’s view, a
sea change in doctrine is needed to replace current search law with a
textualist approach. But as it happens, that “change” would largely
match current law. In my view, current law is already consistent with a
textualist and originalist approach. All that is needed is an appreciation
of how Katz is best understood as consistent with textualism and
originalism.
D. Professors Baude and Stern’s Positive Law Model
In a Harvard Law Review article published in 2016, Professors
Will Baude and James Stern advocated for another alternative to Katz:
the positive law model.282 Baude and Stern’s proposal has been cited
approvingly by originalist judges considering alternatives to Katz.
Justice Gorsuch’s Carpenter dissent quotes it twice,283 and Gorsuch also
mentioned it by name as a possible test at the oral argument for Byrd
v. United States.284 Baude and Stern’s article was also cited prominently
in an opinion by Sixth Circuit Judge Amul Thapar that called for a
rethinking of the Fourth Amendment doctrine along originalist and
textualist grounds.285
The attention paid to Baude and Stern’s article in originalist
circles naturally prompts the question of whether it provides a serious
originalist alternative to Katz. The answer is no. Invented by law
professors in 2016, the model is unrelated to text, divorced from
history, and has no plausible connection to the original meaning of the
Fourth Amendment. The bizarre results that the model produces
further underscore how far removed it is from Fourth Amendment
282. Baude & Stern, supra note 11, at 1823.
283. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2263, 2268 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
284. Transcript of Oral Argument at 24, Byrd v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 1518 (2018) (No.
16-1371) (“Gosh, it’s very complicated. Professors Baude and Stern, among many others, suggest
maybe we ought to look back at that property test again. What do you think?”).
285. See Morgan v. Fairfield County, 903 F.3d 553, 567–75 (6th Cir. 2018) (Thapar, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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history. Judges can understand and appreciate Katz on textualist and
originalist grounds, but they should leave the positive law model in the
faculty lounge.
Some context may be helpful. An early article of mine, “Four
Models of Fourth Amendment Protection” (“Four Models”),286
explained how Supreme Court applications of Katz mixed and matched
among four different models for what makes an expectation of privacy
“reasonable.” Some opinions looked to a probabilistic model and
considered the likelihood of a privacy invasion.287 Other cases looked
to a private facts model and considered whether the outcome of the
conduct was acquisition of particularly private information.288 In some
cases, the Court looked to a positive law model and considered whether
the government violated a law other than the Fourth Amendment.289
And in most cases, the Justices looked to a policy model and considered
whether it was desirable to regulate the government practice.290
Supreme Court opinions mixed and matched among the models,
sometimes invoking multiple models and sometimes rejecting others.
I argued in Four Models that this pluralism was desirable.291 In
applying the reasonable expectation of privacy test, the Supreme Court
distinguished less invasive practices from more invasive practices.292
But there was no universal method to do that. The Court naturally
developed proxy tests for distinguishing more invasive practices that
accurately tracked invasiveness in some cases but not all cases. Because
no one test accurately distinguished more and less invasive practices,
the Court couldn’t adopt any one model.293 Instead, it developed
localized models to guide lower courts: the Supreme Court tended to
use whatever models accurately divided less from more invasive
practices in that kind of case, and then lower courts would reason by
analogy and apply those same models to similar cases.294 This allowed
the Court to distinguish less and more invasive police practices in a
286.
287.
288.
289.
290.
291.
292.
293.
294.

Kerr, Four Models, supra note 258.
Id. at 508–12 (describing the probabilistic model and identifying its applications).
Id. at 512–15 (describing the private facts model and identifying its applications).
Id. at 516–19 (describing the positive law model and identifying its applications).
Id. at 519–22 (describing the policy model and identifying its applications).
Id. at 525–26.
See id. at 529.
See id. at 542.
Id.
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decentralized system in which there are thousands of lower court
decisions and few Supreme Court rulings.295
In their article, Baude and Stern focus on one of the four models
and say it should be the exclusive test for what is a search:
The touchstone of the search-and-seizure analysis should be whether
government officials have done something forbidden to private
parties. It is those actions that should be subjected to Fourth
Amendment reasonableness review and the presumptive
requirement to obtain a warrant. In short, Fourth Amendment
protection should depend on property law, privacy torts, consumer
laws, eavesdropping and wiretapping legislation, anti-stalking
statutes, and other provisions of law generally applicable to private
actors, rather than a freestanding doctrine of privacy fashioned by
courts on the fly.296

Under Baude and Stern’s proposal, courts assessing whether a search
(or even a seizure) has been committed should ask this question:
“[H]as a government actor done something that would be unlawful for
a similarly situated nongovernment actor to do?”297 Put another way,
has the government “employ[ed] special legal powers beyond those
conferred under generally applicable background law”?298 If they did
so through an act “generally likely to obtain information,” it is a search,
while if they did so in an act that includes an “assertion of physical
control,” Baude and Stern argue, the act is a Fourth Amendment
seizure.299
It is worth noting at the outset that Baude and Stern’s test would
create startling results. Imagine that a police officer sees a car driving
at seventy miles per hour in a forty-miles-per-hour zone. The officer,
wanting to catch up to identify the car and driver and write a ticket or
make an arrest, speeds at eighty miles per hour to catch the speeder.
Under the positive law model, the officer’s speeding would be a
“search” that would presumptively require a warrant. This seems odd,
as it doesn’t have anything to do with any traditional concerns
implicated in the Fourth Amendment. An officer likely can’t stop
speeding violations if the officer himself can’t speed to catch speeders.
295.
296.
297.
298.
299.

Id. at 542–45.
Baude & Stern, supra note 11, at 1823.
Id. at 1831 (emphasis omitted).
Id. at 1832.
Id. at 1833.
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So it seems odd, to put it mildly, that the enactment of speeding laws
should make the officer’s chase after the speeder a “search.”
And is the positive law model even originalist? Baude has said it
is,300 although the article itself is noncommittal. Most of Baude and
Stern’s case for the positive law approach is based on nonoriginalist
arguments for why their test is a good one, largely based on a particular
theory of the state outside Fourth Amendment law. For example,
Baude and Stern base their proposal on the principle that “exemptions
from general law stand in tension with liberal notions of political
equality and ordered liberty.”301 This is an interesting claim. But it’s a
claim rooted in political theory, not the history or text of the Fourth
Amendment.
Given the interest among originalists in the positive law model,
however, as well as Baude’s claim that his theory is originalist, it is
worth taking a closer look at the positive law model’s originalist bona
fides (or lack thereof). The closest that Baude and Stern come to
reconciling their proposed test with the Fourth Amendment’s text and
history is notably brief—it spans only five pages in a sixty-six-page
article.302 And it concludes with more of a question than a conclusion:
“the time has come to consider . . . whether [the positive law model] is
compatible with the history leading up to the Fourth Amendment’s
adoption.”303 But with the time now come, what is the answer?
Baude and Stern suggest it is compatible on the following grounds.
First, the cases that inspired the enactment of the Fourth Amendment
involved entering and ransacking homes that sometimes led to trespass
actions such as Entick and Wilkes. “These episodes,” Baude and Stern
write, “have contributed to a longstanding conventional wisdom that
until the mid-twentieth century, trespass was the central test for a

300. Baude wrote two years after his article with Stern:
I do think that our view is an originalist one, derived from what we know of the original
law of the Fourth Amendment. In our article, we discuss both the original history of
the Fourth Amendment and the original remedial structure, and I will let interested
readers judge those arguments for themselves. But originalists should have no qualms
about subscribing to it.
Will Baude, Yes, the Positive Law Model of the Fourth Amendment Is Originalist, REASON:
VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Jan. 12, 2018, 5:48 PM), https://reason.com/volokh/2018/01/12/yes-thepositive-law-model-of-the-fourth [https://perma.cc/3F8P-79KY].
301. Baude & Stern, supra note 11, at 1846.
302. Id. at 1837–41.
303. Id. at 1841.
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Fourth Amendment search.”304 So far, that’s a pretty standard account.
It is inaccurate, I think, as I noted earlier: there actually was no trespass
test for what was a Fourth Amendment search until 2012 in Jones.305
Although this claim is erroneous, it is indeed a common account.
But assuming a trespass test, how do we go from defining a
trespass as a search to defining any violation of any positive law as a
search? Their explanation is worth quoting in full:
The positive law model does not stop at the law of property,
however, and neither did this history, though this part of the story is
frequently overlooked. Wilkes (and the printers arrested along with
him) had sued not just for a property violation but also for false
imprisonment. Other suits similarly challenged searches and seizures
as false imprisonment or other violations of what would today be
thought of as torts relating to personal security. Of course we do not
know exactly how far this went, or more accurately, would have gone.
We cannot say for sure whether the same Founding-era principles
would apply to a suit for, say, “intrusion upon seclusion” because no
such right of action was then recognized. But the history is at least
suggestive, and the most straightforward extrapolation is that the
search-and-seizure principle — the idea that some actions by
government officials raised questions demanding judicial scrutiny —
was marked by violations of positive law, and moreover, by violations
extending beyond the law of property.306

Mull that over. The idea is that some lawsuits filed against what
today would be seen as unreasonable searches and seizures claimed
torts other than trespass—in particular, false imprisonment or some
other (unnamed) personal security torts. We don’t know that those
other torts were significant in those cases. We don’t know that the
nontrespass claims were significant in the cases that influenced the
enactment of the Fourth Amendment. But based on the fact that there
were some nontrespass claims alleged in some of the cases, Baude and
Stern conclude that “the most straightforward extrapolation”307 is that
a search occurs when any positive law is violated.308
This is anything but a “straightforward extrapolation” of the
Fourth Amendment’s history. Why should the presence of nontrespass

304.
305.
306.
307.
308.

Id. at 1839.
See supra notes 208–210.
Baude & Stern, supra note 11, at 1839–40.
Id. at 1839.
Id. at 1839–40.
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claims asserted in a few cases expand the original public meaning of
what is a “search”? And even if false imprisonment torts and maybe
some other torts about personal security were considered part of the
picture at the time of the framing, why would that mean that any
violation of any positive law—not just torts, or crimes, but any statute,
any regulation, anything legal—would be a search?
The leap to an “any positive law” test is particularly puzzling
because there’s a simple explanation for why false imprisonment and
other personal security torts would be claimed in search and seizure
cases in the eighteenth century. As noted earlier, the common law of
search and seizure had a lot of law on the standards for arrests.309
Arrests are seizures of persons.310 And the way that the law of arrest
would be raised was often as an affirmative defense to a tort claiming
false imprisonment or some other tort relating to personal security. If
the investigator broke into a house, the tort was trespass and the
defense would be that the search was reasonable.311 If the investigator
made an arrest, the tort was false imprisonment, and the defense would
be that the seizure was reasonable. The common law of searches and
seizures provided an affirmative defense to these particular torts. That
context provides no basis for expanding Fourth Amendment
protections to any positive law.
Baude and Stern also try to justify the jump from trespass to
positive law by claiming that “the original remedial structure of the
Fourth Amendment”312 echoes their positive law test. Because search
and seizure rules originally acted as a privilege for those enforcing the
law, they reason, Fourth Amendment issues came up when there was
some source of positive law that created a cause of action for which
search and seizure rules could be a defense. “[T]he structure of the
inquiry matches our vision,” they argue, in that there had to be a
positive law violation alleged to trigger litigation on search and seizure
law.313
But that conclusion suffers from a level-of-generality problem.
True, search and seizure issues were litigated when there was a cause
of action for which a search and seizure privilege provided a defense.

309.
310.
311.
312.
313.

See supra notes 143–151.
See Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 208 (1979).
This was the basic dynamic of Entick and Wilkes, of course.
Baude & Stern, supra note 11, at 1840.
Id.
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But those search and seizure claims involved a limited set of tort claims,
like trespass and false imprisonment, that involved searches and
seizures of persons, houses, papers, and effects. In contrast, what
makes Baude and Stern’s test unique is that it goes beyond those
traditional tort claims to cover any law, even apparently when it
provides no cause of action at all, and even if it has nothing to do with
persons, houses, papers, or effects—and even if it doesn’t in any way
involve acts that resemble searches or seizures. What makes the Baude
and Stern test unique is its departure from the history, not its allegiance
to it.
That gap seems particularly challenging from a textualist
perspective. As Baude and Stern recognize, the scenarios that triggered
the Fourth Amendment involved breaking into homes, taking away
property, and arresting people. The text of the Fourth Amendment
expressly limits the right along those lines, declaring a right of the
people “to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures.” The Baude and Stern positive
law model appears to ignore that text and history. Not only does it drop
the idea of any kind of invasion being required, whether physical or
virtual, but it also drops the textual requirement that the invasion be of
one’s person, house, papers, or effects at all. It replaces that with the
rather different idea that any kind of law violation triggers the Fourth
Amendment. It flips the textual and historical focus from protecting
persons, houses, papers, and effects into a new principle against
government exceptionalism in the law. The choice of a test here isn’t
coming from eighteenth-century history. Instead, the work of arriving
at the test appears to come from Professors Baude and Stern, circa
2016.
CONCLUSION
For many originalists, the Supreme Court’s decision in Katz v.
United States has suspicious origins. It is the product of the Warren
Court’s heyday (check). It is not expressly based on the text (check). It
invokes the concept of “privacy” (check). It’s easy to assume that Katz
is a made-up doctrine that has blocked the development of a true legal
test, one based in text and history, that an originalist should seek to
develop and apply.
Not so. The existing Katz framework is readily reconciled with
both text and history. It identifies a “search” of “persons, houses,
papers, and effects,” going beyond the originating facts of physical
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entry to include its technological equivalents. Identifying an
“expectation of privacy” that “society is prepared to recognize as
‘reasonable’”314 is not a call for judicial policymaking. Rather, it calls
for a judgment about what kinds of information collection from and
about “persons, houses, papers, and effects” are the modern-day
equivalents of the physical entry that inspired the Fourth
Amendment’s enactment.
An originalist may want to rephrase the Katz test to be more
explicitly rooted in text and history. But that is about form, not
substance. The substance of the Katz inquiry is entirely consistent with
the Fourth Amendment’s text and history. An effort to reject Katz and
look instead for a textualist and originalist replacement will likely end
up right back where it started—with a doctrine that closely resembles,
and perhaps exactly replicates, Katz.

314.

See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).

